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The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.1
I. Introduction: The Utility of Child Custody and VisitationArbitration
In May of 1855, the abolitionist and feminist Lucy Stone married fellow
anti-slavery activist Henry B. Blackwell.2 Lucy Stone long had been reluctant
to assume the legal position of wife with its attendant legal disadvantages.'
Most notable among these disadvantages were the husband's right to ownership and control of the wife's property and his right to exclusive control and
guardianship ofthe couple's children.4
1. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
2. LoVNGWARRIORs: SELEEDmLETTERs oFLucYSTONEANDHENRYB.BLAcKwELE,
1853-1893, at 135 (Leslie Wheeler ed., 1981) [hereinafter LoV]NG WARRIORS].
3. See id. at 39-41 (reproducing letter of Lucy Stone to Henry Blackwell protesting that
"[t]he rascally statement that a legitimate child belongs to the father in preference to its mother,
is a simple fact of law to which a legal marriage degrades every such mother"); I at 73-77
(providing letter of Henry Blackwell to Lucy Stone attempting to overcome Stone's opposition
to marriage because of its subordination of wife); id. at 80-81 (presenting letter of Lucy Stone
to Henry Blackwell stating that her "horror of being a legal wife" will prevent her from marying
him despite her love for him); id. at 108-11 (showing letter of Henry Blackwell to Lucy Stone
acknowledging pain that she experiences "at the idea of being placed in the legal position of

wife").
4. Id. at 135-36. See generallyNORMA BAScH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN,
MARRIAGE, AND PRoPERTYINNImEThENTH-CENTURYNEw YORK (1982) (explaining restrictions on property rights of married women); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property
Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L.J. 1359 (1983) (discussing development of property rights of
married women in early 1800s); Danaya C. Wright; DeManneville v. DeManneville: Rethink-
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At the couple's wedding ceremony, Henry Blackwell protested against
"such of the present laws of marriage, as refuse to recognize the wife as an
independent, rational being, while they confer upon the husband an injurious
and unnatural superiority."5 Blackwell further spoke of the couple's desire to
opt out of this subordinating law:
We believe that personal independence and equal human rights can never
be forfeited, except for crime; thatmarriage shouldbe an equal and permanent partnership, and so recognized by lawr, that until it is so recognized,
married partners should provide against the radical injustice of present
laws, by every means within their power.
We believe that where domestic difficulties arise, no appeal should be
made to legal tribunals under existing laws, but that all difficulties should
be submitted to the equitable adjustment of arbitrators mutually chosen. 6
In an effort to order their lives together according to their cherished
egalitarian ideal, Stone and Blackwell agreed, prior to their marriage, that if
they ever should separate after their marriage, they would submit any unresolved legal issues arising from their separation, including the question of
custody of any childrenthat they might have together, to a tripartite arbitration
panel.7 This panel would consist of one arbitrator selected by Stone, one
arbitrator selected by Blackwell, and a third arbitrator selected by the two
party-appointed arbitrators. 8 Stone and Blackwell further agreed that the
ing the Birth of CustodyLaw underPatriarchy,17 L. & HIsT. REV. 247 (1999) (discussing law
of coverure and tracing history of English custody law in eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Famil Law: Child
Custody, Adoption and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979) (discussing
development of American child custody law, with attention to presumption of paternal-parental
custody, in early 1800s).
5.
LOVING WARRIORS, supra note 2, at 135;seealsoPEGGYCOOPRDAVI,NEHECTED
STORIEs: TE CoNsTmrION AND FAMILY VAuES 42-49 (1997) (relating stories of several
nineteenth-century couples who included in their marriage ceremony express rejection of those
laws governing married couple that subordinated wife).
6. LOVING WARKIORS, supra note 2, at 136.
7. See id. at 85 (reproducing letter of Henry Blackwell to Lucy Stone in which Blackwell
states that their contract will be protest against laws currently favoring husbands over -wives in
marriages); id. at 109-10 (providing letter of Henry Blackwell to Lucy Stone discussing
proposed contract to entrust issue of custody of any children in event of dissolution of marriage
to arbitrators); ia at 123 (showing letter of Lucy Stone to Henry Blackwell in which Stone
states her intention to prepare "a form" to protest current laws regarding women and marriage);
id. at 136 (presenting copy of Stone-Blackwell wedding protest which states that, in case of
marital difficulty, both Stone and Blackwell want their issues decided not by court of law, but
by "arbitrators mutually chosen").
8. See id. at 109 (providing letter ofHemy Blackwell to Lucy Stone discussing manner
of choosing three arbitrators).
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arbitrators would resolve any such disputes in accordance with principles that
equalized the legal position of husband and wife.9
The story of Lucy Stone and Henry B. Blackwell suggests the potential
utility of arbitration for those who wish to avoid or to dismantle subordinating
law that they feel does not well serve them-" Arbitration might serve these
functions in several ways. First, arbitration might provide a safe harbor from
biased decisionmaking or dysfunctional law for those whose core religious,
political, or social values or beliefs differ significantly and meaningfully from
relevant majoritarian norms." Arbitration allows the parties to an adjudication to designate a decisionmaker who understands and accepts their relevant
values and beliefs. Arbitration also allows the parties to tailor legal standards
to reflect the realities of their lives. In this way, arbitration might serve as a
bulwark against state standardization in matters ofpersonal autonomy.
Second, arbitration might serve as a laboratory for the development of
procedural and substantive reforms of dysfunctional laws. 2 Through arbitration, the parties to a dispute might opt out of the public court systems' default
laws that they believe do not serve them well, and replace such dysfunctional
laws with legal standards thatthey consider more appropriate. By demonstrat9. See id. at 109-10 (presenting letter of Henry Blackwell to Lucy Stone explaining that
"the right to control children [is] to be decided by arbitrators - one each selected by you & me
& one selected by them"); id, at 115-16 (showing letter of Henry Blackwell to Lucy Stone
explaining Blackwell's pledge to refuse to accept and utilize privileges that law confers upon
husband but refuses to confer upon wife); idL at 123 (reproducing letter of Lucy Stone to Henry
Blackwell stating Stone's intention to have agreement for their marriage that covers all possible
disagreements between them); id. at 135-36 (noting "protest" agreed upon by both Lucy Stone
and Henry Blackwell to govern their marriage which stated that "all difficulties should be
submitted to the equitable adjustment of arbitrators mutually chosen").
10. Cf Ronald . Krotoszyski, Jr., The New LegalProcess: GamesPeoplePlayand the
Quest for Legitimate JudicialDecision Making, 77 WASIL U. L.Q. 993, 1034-47 (1999)
(arguing that widespread arbitration of disputes involving minority-culture litigants might
further undermine legitimacy of public courts). See generally E. Gary Spitko, Judge Not: In
Defense ofMinority-CultureArbitration,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065 (1999) (discussing merits of
minority-culture arbitration as safe harbor from majoritarian biases and as instrument for reform
of public court systems).
11. See Stephen J.Ware,DefaultRulesfromMandatoryRules: PrivatizingLawThrough
Arbitration,83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 744-53 (1999) (arguing that arbitration provides means for
corporate entities to replace government default rules with commercial norms of their own
choosing). See generallyE. Gary Spitko, Gone ButNot Conforming: ProtectingtheAbhorrent
Testatorfrom MajoritarianCulturalNorms Through Minority-CultureArbitration,49 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 275 (1999) (seeking to illustrate how testator-compelled arbitration would be
useful in overcoming majoritarian biases in will contests).
12. Spitko, supra note 10, at 1077-83; see alsoWare, supranote 11, at 746-47 (commenting that arbitration allows for "a process of experimentation in which lawmakers learn from each
other and copy laws which seem better").
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ing the merit ofsuch alternate standards for their particular circumstances, the
parties provide a model for public reform of the dysfunctional default laws.
Third, and relatedly, arbitration might serve to lessen resistance in the
general population to public reforms of dysfunctional laws by habituating the
majority to the realities of the lives of cultural minorities and to the notion that
alternative particularized laws are both practical and of great utility for
cultural minorities. 3 Professor Martha Ertman has advanced this general idea
with respect to the enforcement of cohabitation contracts entered into by gay
and lesbian domestic partners. She theorizes that cohabitation contracts might
serve an habituating function leading to progressive reforms favoring gay and
lesbian couples who are presently denied both the 14right to marry and the
benefits that derive from the status of being married.
Professor Ertman points out that as long as a contract is not against
public policy, judicial enforcement and interpretation ofthe contract generally
is "informed by a hands-off rhetoric" that is not especially responsive to
majoritarian morality. 5 That is to say, a court is supposed to enforce the
contract even if the court views the agreement as promoting immorality.16
Professor Ertman hypothesizes that as more and more gay and lesbian couples
enter into cohabitation contracts and as courts more commonly enforce these
contracts, society, which presently denies public rights to gay and lesbian
couples, is likely to become habituated to the reality of the existence of gay
and lesbian couples and to the notion that such couples have legal rights."
This habituation, in turn, might lead society to grant public rights (perhaps
including state-sanctioned marriage) to gay couples. 8 Similarly, arbitration
contracts that provide for the resolution of disputes between minority-culture
13. Spitko, supra note 10, at 1083-85.
14. See MarthaMlErtman,ContractualPurgatoryforSexualMarginorities: NotHeaven,
But Not HellEither, 73 DmEv. U. L.REv. 1107,1137-42,1154 (1996) (arguing that cohabitation
contracts "may habituate heterosexuals to the notion of gay rights, setting the stage for public
rights for gay people").
15. Id. at 1151; see also id at 1144 (noting that "[a]s long as the contract is not against
public policy, judges generally do not second-guess the contractual intentions of two or more

consenting adults").
16. See id. at 1151, 1157 ("Contract rhetoric that a judge should enforce the parties'
actual intent regardless of the judge's subjective view of the moral valence of their intent further
protects gay people who seek to fill statutory gaps through contract").
17. See id. at 1140 (noting that "society may get used to gay couples by increased exposure through courts enforcing gay cohabitation contracts").
18. See id. (arguing that use of cohabitation contracts by gays "may in turn lead society
to grant gay people public rights"); id. at 1154 (noting that use of cohabitation contracts by gays
may be "an essential step in the process of obtaining public rights"); id at 1165 (explaining that
enforcement of "gay-related contracts is an incremental move that. . . will ultimately benefit gay
people because it contributes to the social construction of gay people as legal persons").
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litigants according to legal standards that are responsive to the particular
relevant circumstances of the minority-culture litigants' lives might habituate
the majority to those circumstances and lessen resistance to public reforms of
laws that are dysfunctional with respect to those outside of the majority.
Child custody and visitation disputes are one category of conflict for

which arbitration would seem to be particularly useful in enabling the participants - here, the parents - to avoid and dismantle dysfunctional law in several
ways. In our diverse society, reasonable people are certain to disagree as to
the appropriate values that parents should instill in their children. 19 Child
custody and visitation arbitration has the virtue (some might say the vice) of
allowing parents to choose the values that shall govern the decisionmaker's

resolution of their custody dispute. Just as Lucy Stone and Henry B. Blackwell sought in 1855 to use arbitration to opt out of a law of custody that
disadvantaged the wife and mother in a way that offended the couple's values,
modem families also might use arbitration to opt out of custody laws that fail
to reflect the values or beliefs ofthe family, or that otherwise fail to reflect the
realities of their family structure.

Consider, for example, the situation of a lesbian couple who wish to

begin to co-parent a child. 0 They might together bring the child into the

19. - See Stephen 0. Gilles, Hey Christians,Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 CONST. COMMm'r. 149, 177 (1999) (commenting that "there is no consensus on which practices will
maximize children's well-being over the course of their lifetimes"); Robert H. Mnookin, Child
CustodyAdjudication: JudidalFunctionsinthe Face ofIndeterminancy,39 LAW&CONTCI
.
PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226,230,260-62 (noting lack of societal consensus as to values that
serve best interests of child); see also Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (N.C. 1998)
(concluding that it is not in best interest of children to live with gay parent who is sexually
active in home). The court concluded that
activities such as the regular commission of sexual acts in the home by unmarried
people, failing and refusing to counsel the children against such conduct while
acknowledging this conduct to them, allowing the children to see unmarried
persons known by the children to be sexual partners in bed together, keeping
admittedly improper sexual material [- pictures of "drag queens" -] in the home
and [the father's gay partner]'s taking the children out of the home without their
father's knowledge of their whereabouts support the trial court's findings of
"improper influences" which are "detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the
two minor children."
Pulliam,501 S.E2d at 904.
20. Although this Article focuses on the example of a lesbian co-parented family to
illustrate the utility of child custody and visitation arbitration for overcoming dysfunctional law
and for the purpose of critiquing the present dominant judicial approaches to enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards for child custody and visitation, custody arbitration's utility
for avoiding and overcoming dysfunctional law is not limited to "non-traditional" families.
Indeed, a common fact pattern with which courts have been presented in cases testing the
enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards for child custody involves a traditional
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world through artificial insemination of one of thern, or they might adopt into
their family a child unrelated by blood to either of them. 1 Should this
planned lesbian family fracture at some point during the minority of the child,
the family might find itself entangled in a legal system ill-suited to resolve any
custody or visitation disputes arising from the breakdown of their non-tradi22
tional family.
In many jurisdictions, the law will not recognize the claim that a child
has two mothers or two fathers. The dominant approach to primary parental
nuclear family. The family has agreed to live according to the tenets of Judaism and has agreed
that any custody dispute that might arise out of the fracture of their family would be resolved
by a Beth Din or by other arbitrators versed in Jewish law and would be governed by Jewish
religious law respecting child custody. See Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A2d 425, 430 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1993) (noting error of chancellor in failing to make independent review of Beth
Din's ruling regarding awards of child custody, visitation, child support, alimony, and possession of family home to ensure that interests of children were protected); Cohen v. Cohen, 600
N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that although parties sought to have Rabbinic
Court decide child custody issues, "[d]isputes over custody and visitation are not subject to
arbitration"); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that agreements to arbitrate custody of minor children should not be enforced); Agur v. Agur, 298
N.Y.S.2d 772, 778-79 (App. Div. 1969) (noting that arbitration under Jewish law would "not
serve the court in discharging its duties as parenspatriae"because case raised custody issues
including education, emotional stability, and "place of rearing" that may not be well-addressed
by Jewish law); Rakoszynski v. Rakoszynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d 957, 960-61 (Sup. Ct. 1997)
(refusing to confirm child support award from Beth Din because award "fails to provide any
information whatsoever as to how the amount was arrived at, is not in the best interest of the
children and does not comply with current public policy" and noting that such awards by
arbitrators are not always precluded and must "demonstrate at least minimal recognition of, and
compliance with" New York law); Liebernan v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494-95 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (vacating portion of Beth Din's order providing for joint custody because of order's
adverse impact on children).
21.
For a discussion of the increased prevalence of gay and lesbian planned families in
modem society, see Nancy D. Polikoff Brief. The Social ConstructionofParenthoodin One
PlannedLesbian Family,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 213,219 & n.2, 221-27 (1996).
See also Spitko, supra note 10, at 1078-79 (discussing increased number of gay and lesbian coparented families).
22. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, WhoIs a Parent?: The Need toDevelop a LesbianConscious
FamitvLaw, 10 N.Y.L. ScIL 3. HuM. RTS. 513,514 (1993) ("The experiences oflesbians having
children cannot be addressed by trying to fit them into a family law system that is so resolutely
heterosexual in its structure and presumptions."); Polikoft supra note 21, at 227 (arguing that
to better serve increasing number of gay and lesbian planned families, law must move beyond
its assumption that every child can have only one mother and one father); Nancy D. Polikoff,
This ChildDoesHave TwoMothers: RedefiningParenthoodto Meet the Needs of Childrenin
Lesbian-MotherandOtherNon-TraditionalFamilies,
78 GEo. L.. 459,463 (1990) (noting that
lesbian family faces legal system "ill-prepared to recognize its existence and to formulate rules
to resolve its disputes," especially question of child custody between birth mother and other
woman in lesbian family).
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rights derives such rights from a biological or adoptive relationship to the
child or a legal marriage to a person who is legally recognized as the parent
of the child. 3 Especially in jurisdictions that refuse to allow same-sex coparent adoptions, 24 such an approach to parental rights is presumptively
dysfunctional for a lesbian couple. Biological co-parentage ofthe child by the
lesbian couple is, at present, a physical impossibility, and a state-recognized
marriage of the biological mother and her same-sex partner is, to date, a legal
impossibility?5 Under such a regime, therefore, only one of the co-parents
23. See Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Family - NothingMore,Nothing Less: How the
JudicialSystem HasRefused to ProtectNonlegalParentsinAlternativeFamilies,8 J.L. &PoL.
5, 6-7 (1991) (noting that parental bonds within "alternative families" often do not receive legal
recognition and that "[t]hose parental relationships within alternative families that have received
limited recognition are either based on a biological connection with the child or a marital
relationship with the biological parent"); Marsha Garrison, Law MakingforBaby Making: An
InterpretiveApproachto theDeterminationofLegalParentage,113 HARV.L. REV. 835, 882-84
(2000) (discussing law of parental status, including importance of biological parentage and
marital presumption of legitimacy); see also UNIFORM PARENTAGE Acr § 4(a), 9B U.LA 29899 (1987) (creating presumptionthat man is father of child if child is born during man's marriage
to child's mother, or if man marries child's mother and man has sufficiently acknowledged child
to be his); id. at § 5 (providing that husband who consents to his wife's artificial insemination
with sperm of another man and under supervision of licensed physician, is legal father of child
thereby conceived); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-30 (1989) (upholding against
constitutional challenge California's legislative preference granting paternity rights in favor of
husband of child's mother attime of child's conception over putative biological father).
24. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Wis. 1994) (holding that proposed
adoption by lesbian co-parent of her partner's biological child was prohibited by Wisconsin's
adoption statute, even though trial court had found that adoption would be in best interests of
child, because biological mother's parental rights had not been terminated). But see Adoption
of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (interpreting Massachusetts's adoption statue as
allowing lesbian couple to adopt natural child of one of them without termination of natural
mother's legal relationship with child); In re Jacob, 660 N.E2d 397, 404-06 (N.Y. 1995)
(interpreting New York's adoption law as allowing natural mother's lesbian partner to adopt her
child without requiring termination of natural parent's parental rights where natural parent has
consented to adoption and has agreed to retain parental rights and to raise her child jointly with
her lesbian partner); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt 1993) (holding that
Vermont's adoption statute allows biological mother's child to be adopted by mother's lesbian
partner even without termination of biological mother's parental rights because, inter alia, "[t]o
deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no legitimate state interest"); see also Act of June 1, 2000,
Pub.ActNo. 00-228 (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-724(aX3) & 45a-731(5))
(legislatively overruling In re Adoption ofBaby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1055-56 (Conn. 1999),
which had interpreted Connecticut's adoption statute as not allowing lesbian co-parent to adopt
her partner's biological child unless biological mother first relinquished her parental rights); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (1989 & Supp. 2000) (codifying holding of Adoption of
B.L.VB. by allowing parent's partner to adopt her or his child without termination of that legal
parent's parental rights).
25. See Ettelbrick, supra note 22, at 516-19 (making this point and urging that realities
of lesbians' lives be taken into account in developing family law system).
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may enjoy the legal status of parent. This failure ofthe law to recognize both
lesbian co-parents as legal parents of the child disserves the family in numerous ways, including denying the non-legal parent the legal authority to make
important decisions for the child, denying the child the right to qualify for
certain benefits through the non-legal parent,' and denying both the child and
the non-legal parent the right to inherit under intestacy statutes from or
through each other.Y
In the event of a fracture of the relationship between the co-parents, the
law might continue to disserve greatly both the non-legal co-parent and the
child. In many jurisdictions, the non-legal co-parent will be without standing
to petition for custody or even visitation rights with respect to the child.28
26. See KarenCzapanskiy,Interdependencies,Families,and Children,39 SANTACLARA
L. REV. 957, 985 (1999) ("Family law in the United States identifies biological or legal parents
as the people usually entitled to exercise legal authority in regard to a child.").
27. See Theresa Glennon, Binding the Family Ties: A ChildAdvocacy Perspective on
Second-ParentAdoptions,7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.REV. 255,258-59 (1988) (pointing out
that when lesbian couple is denied right to second-parent adoption with respect to child they are
co-parenting, child is disadvantaged by remaining ineligible for benefits through her nonlegal
parent such as employer provided health insurance, state worker's compensation benefits,
federal Social Security benefits, intestate inheritance rights, and court-ordered child support).
See generally Susan N. GaryAdaptinglntestacyLaws to ChangingFamilies, 18 LAW & INEQ.
1 (2000) (exploring need for and feasibility of intestacy reform to recognize relationship
between functional parents and functional children).
28. See e.g., Guardianship of Z.C.W. and K.G.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 50 (Ct. App.
1999) (concluding that "[t]he Legislature has not conferred upon ... a nonparent in a same-sex
bilateral relationship, any right of custody or visitation [with respect to the child she has coparented with her lesbian partner] upon termination of the relationship"); Kazmierazak v. Query,
736 So. 2d 106, 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that lesbian co-parent, who alleged
that she had become psychological parent of child whom she had jointly raised with her former
partner, "lacks standing to seek custody or visitation of [her former partner]'s biological child
against [the biological mother's] wishes"); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 NE.2d 27, 28-29
(N.Y. 1991) (stating that lesbian co-parent lacked standing to petition for custody or visitation
of child with whom she had developed "close and loving relationship"); Ronald FF. v. Cindy
GO., 511 N.E.2d 75, 76-77 (N.Y. 1987) (explaining that court may not grant visitation rights
with respect to child to man who, although he had acted as father to child, was not child's
biological father, when child's mother had custody of child and no "compelling State purpose
which furthers the child's best interests" had been shown); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d 419, 423 (Wis. 1995) (stating that person who is not biological or adoptive parent of
child has no standing to bring action for custody of child unless child's biological or adoptive
parent is unfit or there otherwise are compelling reasons for granting custody to non-parent);
UNIF. MARRiAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 401(d), 9A U.LA 550 (1987) (providing that non-parent
may petition for custody of child only if child is not in physical custody of one of her parents).
But see E.N.O. v. LM.M,
711 N.E.2d 886,889-93 (Mass. 1999) (stating that probate court has
equity jurisdiction to grant visitation rights to lesbian co-parent who has acted as "de facto"
parent to child - that is - to one who has "reside[d] with the child and, with the consent and
encouragement of the legal parent, perform[ed] a share of the caretaking functions at least as
great as the legal parent"), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 500 (1999); V.C. v. M.B., 748 A.2d 539,
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Even in a jurisdiction that allows the non-legal parent to petition for custody

or visitation rights, the non-legal parent might still be disadvantaged by
substantive rules of custody and visitation decisionmaking that favor the legal

parent in any contest with a non-parent.'

For example, the non-legal co-

parent might have to demonstrate the unfitness of the legal co-parent or some
554 (N.J. 2000) (noting that lesbian co-parent who demonstrates that she has become psychological parent to child "stands in parity with the legal parent" with respect to child custody and
visitation issues, although "[tihe legal parent's status is a significant weight in the best interests
balance"), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct 302 (2000); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663-64 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1992) (finding that child visitation provisions of co-parenting agreement between legal
mother and non-legal co-parent are enforceable if such agreement is in best interests of child);
Jean Maby H v. Joseph R, 676 N.Y.S.2d 677,681-82 (App. Div. 1998) (distinguishingRonald
FF.and Alison D. and finding mother to be equitably estopped from denying her husband's
right to seek custody and visitation of her child where mother had held her husband out to be
child's father for seven years and where husband had developed strong parent/child relationship
with child); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,43447 (Wis. 1995) (explaining that
court may exercise its equitable powers to grant lesbian co-parent visitation rights with respect
to child whom she had jointly parented with her former lesbian partner if it concludes that coparent had parent-like relationship with child and "significant triggering event justiffies] state
intervention in the child's relationship with the biological or adoptive parent").
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution grant to a
"parent by estoppel" and to a qualifying "de facto parent" the standing to bring an action for
custodial or decisionmaking responsibility with respect to a child. A de facto parent qualifies
only if she has lived with the child within the six-month period immediately preceding the filing
of the action or consistently has maintained or attempted to maintain a parental relationship with
the child since residing with the child. PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AD RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.04(l)(b) & (c) (Tentative Draft No. 4,2000). Under
the Principles, a parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, has lived
with the child since the child's birth or for at least two years and, as part of an agreement with
the child's parent or parents, has held herself out as a parent and has accepted full and permanent parental responsibilities. In addition, the court must find that treating such a person as a
parent by estoppel is in the child's best interests. Id. at § 2.03(l)(b)(ii) and (iv). A de facto
parent is an individual who, though not a legal parent or a parent by estoppel, for a period of
at least two years has lived with the child and for primarily non-financial reasons has regularly
performed either a majority of the caretaking functions for the child or at least as great a share
ofthose functions as the parent with whom the child primarily lived performed. In addition, for
an individual to qualify as a de facto parent, the individual must have so acted either with the
agreement of the child's legal parent or as a result of the legal parent's complete failure or
inability to perform caretaking functions for the child. Id. at § 2.03(1)(c).
29. See e.g., JAL. v. E.P.I., 682 A.2d 1314,1318-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating that
custody contestant who is not legal parent of child she and her former partner had co-parented
enjoys standing to petition for custody of child, but faces "increased burden of proof" as nonparent contesting custody against parent); see also Naomi R. Calm, RefrainingChild Custody
Decisionmaking,58 OIo ST. L.J. 1,14-17,3547 (1997) (discussing ways in which determination of who qualifies as parent influences child custody adjudication); John DeWitt Gregory,
Blood Ties: A RationaleforChildVisitation by LegalStrangers,55 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 351,
351-52 (1998) (reviewing state of law with respect to non-parental child visitation and concluding that "[m]ore often than not, natural parents successfully resist assertions of child visitation
rights by legal strangers such as stepparents and so-called lesbian 'coparents'").
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likelihood of harm to the child before the court will consider awardink custodyto the non-legal co-parent.30 These legal principles not only disadvantage
the non-legal co-parent, but also risk harm to the child by denying the child
the stability of a continuing relationship with both of her mothers without any
justification related to the quality of the non-legal co-parent's performance of
her parental duties.3
30. See e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216 (1991) (explaining that
custody may be awarded to non-parent who qualifies as "de facto parent" only "if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that parental custody is detrimental to the children");
Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (Ind.CL App. 1994) ("While Indiana courts
can award custody of a child to someone other than the parents, such awards are usually made
only following a determination that the parents are either unfit or have all but abandoned the
child to the care of that third person."); In re Marriage of Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 58, 64-65 (Or.
1987) (en bane) (noting that aunt who had raised child for several years and since shortly after
child's birth had standing to petition for custody of child, but child's father was entitled to
custody absent showing of "compelling reasons" for granting custody to non-parent).
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution treat a parent
by estoppel the same as a legal parent with respect to the allocation of custodial and
decisionmaking responsibilities. PRINCIPiES OF THE LAW OF FAMILYDISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 209,210 (Tentative DraftNo. 3, PartI, 1998); PRINCIPLES OFTHE
LAW OFFAMILYDISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.21 (Tentative DraftNo.
4,2000). The Principles give preference to a legal parent or a parent by estoppel over a de facto
parent in a disputed custody matter. PRINCPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.21 (Tentative Draft No. 4,2000). Specifically, a court
ordinarily is precluded from allocating
the majority of custodial responsibility to a de facto parent over the objection of a
legal parent or a parent by estoppel who is fit and willing to assume the majority of
custodial responsibility unless ... the legal parent or parent by estoppel has not
been performing a reasonable share of parenting functions... or... the available
alternatives would cause harm to the child.
Id. § 2.21(lXa). In such circumstances, a de facto parent still may obtain an allocation of
custodial or decisionmaking authority, but such an allocation must not be greater than the
allocation to the legal parent or parent by estoppel. Id. Also, the Principles call for a court to
in light of
deny an allocation of custodial or decisionmaking authority to a de facto parent if,
the number of other adults to be allocated such authority, an allocation to the de facto parent
would be "impractical." Id. § 2.21(l)(b). Finally, the Principles provide that a legal parent and
a parent by estoppel, but not a do facto parent, ordinarily are entitled to a presumptive allocation
of custodial responsibility. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
REcoMMENDATIONS §§ 209(lXa) (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part , 1998).
31. See JOSEPH (OIDSTEINET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 28-42
(1979) (advocating principle of minimum state intervention in child/caretaker relationship, that
should apply not only to legal parents but also to non-parent long-term caretakers, given "crucial
bonds" that develop between child and her long-term caretaker and given harm likely to result
from disruption of such bonds); Katharine T. Bartlett, RethinkingParenthoodas an Exclusive
Status: The Needfor LegalAlternativesWhen the Premise of the NuclearFamilyHas Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879, 902 (1984) ("Vigorous debate rages over how a child develops, what is in
a child's best interests, and how to achieve certain objectives on behalf of a child. Near
consensus does exist, however, for the principle that a child's healthy growth depends in large
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Arbitration might enable the lesbian couple to "provide against the
radical injustice of present laws"' 2 that deny an equal opportunity for both coparents to establish custody and visitation rights upon the fracture of their
relationship. As early as prior to the birth or adoption of their child into their
family, the co-parents might agree to be bound, in the event of a fracture of

their relationship, by an arbitration agreement governing any potential custody
or visitation dispute with respect to their child. Such an agreement might
require the co-parents to arbitrate any such custody or visitation dispute before
an arbitrator of their choice who shall use rules of standing and substantive
standards that do not privilege a legal co-parent over a non-legal co-parent on
the basis of her status as a legal parent.33
part upon the continuity of his personal relationships."); Peggy C. Davis, The Good Mother:
A New Look at PsychologicalParentTheory,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347,354-62
(1996) (summarizing recent social science research on child attachment which supports
conclusion that children attach strongly to both of their parents, that these bonds are important
to child's well-being, and that children of divorce fare better if they are allowed to maintain
"positive contact" with both of their parents after fracture of family); John DeWitt Gregory,
InterdependencyTheory-OldSausagein a New Casing: A Responseto ProfessorCzapanskiy,
39 SANTA CLA"AL. REV. 1037,1042 (1999) (stating principle that children should have contact
post-divorce with both parents because this provides stability and is "long accepted and
generally recognized principle" of family law); Mnookin, supra note 19, at 265 (commenting
that "a substantial and impressive consensus exists among psychologists and psychiatrists that
disruption of the parent-child relationship carries significant risks"); Recommendation of the
LawRevision Commissionto the 1985LegislatureRelatingto ChildCustodyDecisions-Making
Process, 19 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 105, 119 (1985) (providing New York Law Review
Commission's report that "[t]ho available evidence points almost without equivocation to the
conclusion that children are better off if both parents are meaningfully involved in their lives
after their separation").
32. LovNo WARRIORS, supranote 2, at 136.
33. In circumstances where a parent who is not a party to the co-parenting agreement
retains custody or visitation rights with respect to the child (for example, where a father of a
child of one of the lesbian partners has retained his parental rights), the ability of the co-parents
to contract for custody and visitation rights or for arbitration of such rights might be limited.
The situation is similar to the case of a mother and legal step-father who wish to contract for
custody rights in favor of the step-father with respect to his step-child, but where the father of
the child has retained his parental rights. In each case, the contracting parties will not be able
to contract in such a way that impairs the rights ofthe non-contracting parent See, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3101(a) & (c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (providing that court may grant
reasonable visitation rights to stepparent, but not if such award of visitation to stepparent would
conflict with visitation or custodial rights of "a birth parent who is not a party to the proceeding"); In re A.R.A., 919 P.2d 388, 391-92 (Mont 1996) (holding that father is entitled to
custody of his child, absent abuse or neglect by father, when custodial mother has passed away,
even though mother had named stepfather as child's guardian in her will); Carr v. Prader, 725
A.2d 291,295-96 (R. 1999) (holding that family court may grant permanent guardianship over
child to non-parent nominated by child's late mother, over objection of surviving father, only
if father's consent has been made unnecessary by termination of his parental rights). Indeed,

even in a state that allows second-parent adoptions, the adoption might be precluded if the
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Thus, just as Lucy Stone and Henry B. Blackwell sought to contract out

of the rule that the father of a married couple's child was presumptively
entitled to custody of the child, a lesbian couple might seek to contract out of
the rule that the biological mother of a child co-parented by the lesbian couple
is presumptively entitled to custody of the child. The couple would be able
to choose from a variety of proposed alternate standards for standing and

proposed alternate substantive standards for visitation and custody that better
serve gay and lesbian families than does the dominant law because these

alternate standards do not base parental rights on biology, adoption, or marriage but rather on a functional parental relationship with the child. 4 Moreover, the couple would be able to guard against some anti-minority ignorance
parent not in the same-sex partnership (for example, the father where the mother and her partner
seek to adopt the child) will not consent See Act of June 1, 2000, Pub. Act No. 00-228

(codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-724(aX3) & 45a-731(5)) (allowing for second
parent adoptions "ifthe parental rights, if any, of any other person other than the parties to such
agreement [for adoption between the legal parent and her partner] have been terminated"); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-401(a) & (b) (1989 & Supp. 2000) (requiring, except in narrow
circumstances, consent of both of child's parents to child's adoption); see also Garrison,supra
note 23, at 885-86, 895-96 (discussing line of Supreme Court cases protecting right of unmarried fathers to veto adoption of their children and noting that principle of parentage law is that
"even an unmarried father can trump the claims of a prospective adoptive parent able to offer
the child greater advantages"). See generallyNancy D. Polikoff, The DeliberateConstruction
ofFamilieswithout Fathers:Is It an OptionforLesbianandHeterosexualMothers?, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 375 (1996) (discussing need for legal reform with respect to voluntary termination of paternal rights in cases where lesbian couple or single woman wish to raise child without
involvement ofbiological father as legal father).
34. See e.g., Bartlett, supranote 31, at 944-48 (calling for recognition of child's need for
continuity in intimate relationships by permitting visitation and custody by persons who have
established important familial relationship with child, provided that such relationship began
with consent of legal parent or pursuant to court order and that nuclear family has been
disrupted); Czapanskiy, supra note 26, at 963-64, 970-73, 985-86, 990 (proposing "interdependency" approach to custody and visitation rights that would accord parental rights to either coparent in same sex relationship and would base such rights not on biology or legal parent status
but rather on co-parent's history as caregiver); Polikoff supra note 22, at 471 (arguing that
parental status should derive not only from biology or adoption, but also "from proof of a
parent-child relationship that has developed through the cooperation and consent of someone
already possessing the status of a legal parent"); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental
Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 617-19, 630-43 (1992) (arguing for
approximation" standard in child custody and visitation decisionmaking that would seek to
approximate past patterns of care).
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution provide for a
judicial allocation of custodial responsibility that, unless a specified exception applies, approximates the proportion of caretaking that each parent, parent by estoppel, or de facto parent
performed prior to fracture of the family. PRINMCIPS OF THE LAW OF FAMMY DISSOLUTON:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 209 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, 1998); PEINCPI_. OF
THE LAW OF FAMILYDISsOLu'ION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.21 (TentativeDraft
No. 4,2000).
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and bias in the public court system by selecting an arbitrator who is familiar

with lesbian co-parented families.3"
If each parent who is partyto an arbitration agreement that seeks to avoid
custody law that the parties disfavor or find dysfunctional could be certain
that the other parent would abide by the arbitrator's decision, then custody
arbitration might be a most attractive solution to the problem of disfavored or
dysfunctional law regardless of whether or not a court would enforce any

resulting arbitration award for custody.36 One might reasonably expect,

however, that the party who would enjoy the stronger legal position in the
public courts would seek to have the public court system decide the custody
issue in accordance with dominant legal standards.37 Moreover, one might
reasonably fear that regardless of any disparity in treatment of the custody
claimants under the dominant law, a party who ultimately is unhappy with an
arbitrator's custody award might seek to relitigate the custody issue in the
public courts. 38 One might reasonably expect, therefore, that upon the fracture

of the family, the lesbian co-parent who is recognized by the dominant law as
the child's sole legal mother would be likely to repudiate the family that she
35. See Jeanne Louise CarriereRepresentingtheNativeAmerican: Culture, Jurisdiction,
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 585, 602-05 (1994) (noting that testimony
in congressional hearings concerning Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 "identified EuroAmerican cultural bias [on the part of persons applying parenting standards to Native American
parents] as the underlying cause of the danger [of forced acculturation] to Native American
families and culture"); Polikoft supra note 22, at 544 (noting that "[m]any judges deciding
lesbian-mother family dissolution cases do not have experience with or knowledge about life
growing up with lesbian mothers").
36. See Janet Maleson Spencer & Joseph P. ZammitMediation-Arbitration:A Proposal
for PrivateResolution of DisputesBetween Divorced or SeparatedParents,1976 DUKE L.J.
911, 925 (noting ease of utilizing arbitration if all parties agree to it and agree to abide by
decision of arbitrator).
37. See Ettelbrick, supra note 22, at 547 ("Naturally, when conflict arises, the biological
mothers will rely on the advantage the law gives them, regardless of the 'lesbian ethic' that we
honor our agreements with each other with regard to parenting.").
38. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A2d 425,428-30 (Md. Ct Spec.App. 1993) (noting
that mother who had entered into post-fracture arbitration agreement and who had participated
in several arbitration sessions argued after entry of arbitration award that court must exercise
its "independent judgment" in any matter concerning best interests of children); Faherty v.
Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257, 1259-61 (NJ. 1984) (noting that father who had successfully moved
to compel arbitration of spousal and child support issues, but who was unhappy with resulting
arbitration award, then argued that arbitration of such issues was against public policy);
Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490,492-95 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (discussing mother who
had agreed to settle custody dispute before rabbinical court, had agreed that "any decision of
the Rabbinical Court will be obeyed," had selected one of the arbitrators, and had participated
in six arbitration sessions costing $1000 each, and then had moved to vacate resulting arbitration award on grounds, inter als, that award was not in best interests of children).
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and her co-parent have formed and would be likely to seek refuge in3 the
public
9
court system which refuses to recognize the validity of that family.
Thus, the utility of child custody and visitation arbitration, in many cases,
will be a function of the extent to which the public courts will enforce arbitration agreements and awards for custody and visitation. Indeed, if such agreements are not enforceable, arbitration might lose much of its utility regardless
of whether the parties to the agreement ultimately would respect the agree-

ment and any resulting arbitration award. For example, in the case of a coparented lesbian family, the knowledge on the part ofthe legally more vulnerable party (the non-legal parent) that she would be unable to enforce any
future arbitration award concerning the custody of her child would mean that
the more vulnerable party would have to decide whether and to what extent
to invest emotionally and financially in a relationship with a child while
knowing that the continuance of that relationship would be wholly dependent
on the good will of her partner.4" Thus, the inability of the partners to create
39. See Clark Freshman, PrivatizingSame-Sex 'Marriage"Through Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Community-Enhancing VersusCommunit-EnablingMediation,44 UCLAL. REV.
1687, 1748-49 (1997) (reporting decision of Los Angles Gay and Lesbian Center to end
referrals to lesbian attorney who, in representing biological mother in fractured co-parenting
relationship, argued that non-biological co-parent in such relationship should have few, if any,
custody or visitation rights with respect to couple's child); Polikoff, supra note 22, at 533-42,
537 (discussing several cases in which biological mother in lesbian co-parenting relationship
"has asserted sole parenthood in a blatant repudiation of the family that both mothers fully

participated in creating").
The Gay and LesbianAdvocates & Defenders (GLAD), in collaboration with several other
gay and lesbian civil rights organizations, has authored a statement of principles that it urges
same-sex families to follow in dealing with the breakup of their family. Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders et al., Protecting Families: Standardsfor Child Custody in Same-Sex
Relationships,at httpA/www.colage.orgparents/custodyrights.html (April 11, 2000). Among
these is the principle of"lreat[ing] homophobic law and sentiments as off limits." Id. GLAD
argues that resort to such homophobie law threatens injury to the family members involved as
well as to the collective interests ofgay men and lesbians:
A focus solely on the legal rights of the biological or adoptive parent ignores the
real relationships of many parents, significant adults, and children. It is extremely
damaging to our community and our families when we disavow as insignificant the
very relationships for which we are seeking legal and societal respect
Id.
40. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parentsas Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REV.
2401, 2463 (1995) ("Legal protection of parental rights and authority serves as an important
form of compensation for fulfillment of parental obligations and thus functions to serve the
child's interest in receiving good care from her parents."); see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,
980-84 (1979) (setting forth argument that "the inability to make enforceable promise [concerning child custody and visitation] may inhibit dispute settlement"); infira notes 264-73 and
accompanying text (discussing how state deference to parental authority functions as incentive
for good parental behavior).
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a family in which both parents have equal and enforceable legal rights and
responsibilities with respect to their child might influence their decision as to
whether to raise a child jointly and, if they were to decide to do so, their
decisions concerning the degree to which and the manner in which each coparent would invest in her relationship with the child.
This Article considers the extent to which agreements for the arbitration
of child custody and visitation issues and resulting arbitration awards should
be enforceable in the public courts. Two principal competing interests enter
into the calculus. The parents involved in the custody and visitation dispute
have an interest in maintaining influence over the manner in which their child
is reared, which includes, perhaps most critically, an interest in maintaining
control over the values that their child is taught to respect.4' This interest in
parental autonomy is furthered by respect for the finality of any custody or
visitation arbitration award when the parents had agreed to submit their
custody dispute to binding arbitration. The state has an interest, derivative of
the child's interests, in protecting the welfare of the child who is at the center
of the custody and visitation dispute. Conventional wisdom holds that this
interest in child welfare is promoted by intrusive state review of any arbitration award for child custody or visitation.
In Part II, this Article reviews the approaches that courts presently take
to the issue of enforcing arbitration agreements and awards for child custody
and visitation. Generally, a court will not treat such an agreement or award
as binding. Rather, in general, relying upon its parens patriae2 duties to
protect the welfare of a child, a court will replace an arbitrator's award for
child custody and visitation with a custody and visitation order of its own
design whenever
the court believes thatto do so would serve the best interests
43
of the child.
41. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 248 ("The antislavery ideal of family autonomy is a necessary component in any design to permit individuals to affect their culture and to embrace,
advocate, and act upon freely chosen values, because it is in families that people are socialized
to varied values, rather than uniform ones.").
42. "Parenspabiae"is Latin for "parent of his or her country" and connotes "the state in
its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW
DIcnONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
43. In another context, Judge Cardozo gave the classic description of the court fulfilling
itsparenspatnaefunction with respect to a child:
[the court] acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child.
[The judge] is to put himself in the position of a "wise, affectionate, and careful

parent," and make provision for the child accordingly .... He is not adjudicating
a controversy between adversary parties, to compose their private differences. He

is not determining rights "as between a parent and a child," or as between one
parent and another. He "interferes for the protection of infants, qua infants, by
virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the Crown as parens patriae."
Finlay v. Finlay, 148 NE. 624,626 (N.Y. Ct App. 1925) (citations omitted).
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Next; Part III ofthis Article considers how academic commentators have
proposed to balance the parents' interest in the finality of a custody arbitration
award with the state's interest in promoting the welfare of the child. These
commentators share a common failure to focus their analysis on the constitutional principles and prudential considerations that generally have guided state
deference to and intervention in the family. To the extent that these constitutional principles are applicable and these prudential policies are applicable,
well-thought out and well-grounded, it is important to ask whether the present
dominant judicial approaches ofintrusive state review of custody and visitation
arbitration awards are in accord with these principles and policies or whether
a more deferential approachto state review of custody and visitation arbitration
awards would be more consistent with these principles and policies.
The state traditionally has shown a great reluctance to interfere with the
autonomy of the parent-child relationship. This great deference is grounded
on two principles: a constitutional and social norm respecting the "right"of
parents to control the upbringing of their child and a prudential belief that
extensive state intervention in the parent-child relationship would be unlikely
to promote the state's desired outcome - that the child develop into a physically and psychologically healthy adult capable of contributing to the wellbeing of society.
Part IV of this Article addresses the constitutional and social norm of
respecting parental autonomy and the prudential factors that militate against
extensive state intervention in the family and considers how these policies
relate to the issue of enforcement of custody and visitation arbitration awards.
This Part concludes that the present approach of intrusive judicial review of
custody and visitation arbitration awards contravenes the constitutional norm
respecting parental autonomy and is inconsistent with the prudential policies
governing state deference to and intervention in the family. A standard of
review that gives "great deference" to an arbitrator's custody and visitation
award, or that requires a showing of a likelihood of harm to the child flowing
from the arbitrator's custody and visitation arbitration award, before a court
would disregard that award, would be more consistent with the constitutional
principles and prudential considerations that generally govern state intervention in the family44
44.

I use the term "parent" in this article in both legal and social senses, as is suggested

by my use of the term "non-legal co-parent" The critique of the dominant approaches to
enforcement of child custody arbitration agreements is simpler and arguably stronger with
respect to an arbitration agreement entered into by two legal parents of a child, as contrasted

with an agreement entered into by a legal parent and a social but non-legal co-parent Such a
critique is able to rely upon the concomitant rights that flow from the legal status of "parent"
more clearly and directly. Nevertheless, I believe that the constitutional principles discussed
below are applicable to an arbitration agreement entered into by a legal parent and a social but
non-legal co-parent See infra notes 238-55 and accompanying text (arguing that court's failure
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ff. The JudicialTreatment ofArbitrationAgreements andAwardsfor
Child Custody and Visitation
The large majority of courts that have considered whether child custody
and visitation are arbitrable issues have refused to treat as binding on the court
an arbitrator's award respecting child custody or visitation." Several features
of custody arbitration especially concern these courts. Private arbitration
provides no assurance that the arbitrators chosen by the parents will have a
specialized competence to adjudicate a custody dispute. 6 Moreover, even a
competent arbitrator may choose to disregard the jurisdiction's legal standards
for custody adjudication, absent direction in the arbitration contract to apply
such standards. Finally, courts subject arbitration awards generally to only
a very limited judicial review,48 which, some fear, might fail to safeguard
adequately a child's interests.49
to enforce child custody agreement executed by lesbian family may infringe on constitutional
rights of parties involved). I also believe that the prudential factors discussed below, which
together militate in favor of a deferential standard of review for child custody arbitration awards,
apply with equal or even greater force in the cases of families headed by a legal parent and a
social but non-legal co-parent See infra notes 316-19 and accompanying text (arguing for
courts to be more deferential to family agreements of same-sex family).
45. See infra notes 54-84 and accompanying text (discussing void and voidable approaches
to custody arbitration agreements and awards).
46. See, e.g., Agur v. Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772,777 (App. Div. 1969) (noting that arbitration provides no assurance that parents will nominate arbitrators "whose background or
competence would certify a provident decision").
47. See, e.g., id. at 778 (invalidating arbitration agreement for custody, in part, because
agreement called for arbitrators to apply Jewish law in making their custody decision);
Michelman v. Michelman, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608,608 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (noting that arbitrators "need
not follow the law in their considerations and awards" and that courts have set aside such
arbitration awards as against public policy); Crutehley v. Crutchley, 293 S.E.2d 793, 797 (N.C.
1982) (stating that "arbitrator is bound by neither substantive law nor rules of evidence").
48. For example, the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955 (JAA), which has been adopted
in thirty-five states and the District of Columbia, see 7 U.L.A. §1 (1997) (listing states that have
adopted UAA), provides for confirmation of an arbitration award unless one who is opposing
confirmation demonstrates that there was no arbitration agreement, there was fraud in procuring
the award, there was arbitrator bias or corruption, the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or the
arbitrators wrongfully refused to postpone a hearing or to hear material evidence. Id. § 12; see
also Federal Arbitration Act, §§ 9-10 (providing for limited grounds for vacating arbitration
award, which grounds are similar to those provided for by UAA). In August 2000, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and recommended for enactment a revised Uniform Arbitration Act Section 23 of the revised Uniform Arbitration Act,
which sets forth the grounds for vacating an arbitration award, is substantially similar to Section
12 of the 1955 UAA cited above.
49. See, e.g., Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 1993) (noting
tension between "the expectation of finality of arbitration awards" and court's concern with
protecting interests of child); Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (noting that arbitration awards cannot
be vacated because of mistake of fact and that judicial system "is more broadly gauged and
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When these courts voice a distrust of child custody arbitration, and

particularly of a limited judicial review of custody arbitration awards, their
concern is more than merely the fear that a trial-level error will go uncorrected. Indeed, even child custody adjudications in the public courts are not
subject to rigorous appellate review.5" This limited effective judicial review
of trial court custody awards stems from the subjective and indeterminate
nature of the custody decisionmaking process.
Adeten inationthatisperson-oriented andrequires predictions necessarily
involves an evaluation ofthe parties who have appeared in court. This has
important consequences for the roles of both precedent and appellate
review in custody cases. The result of an earlier case involving different
people has limited relevance to a subsequent case requiring individualized
evaluations ofaparticularchildandthelitigants. Priorreported cases now
provide little basis for controlling orpredictingthe outcome ofaparticular
case. Moreover, the trial court in custody disputes is often not required to
make specific findings of fact, much less write an opinion about the case
or reconcile
what has been done in this case with what has happened
3
before. '

It would seem, therefore, that the courts' dominant concern with a scheme of
limited judicial review of custody arbitration awards is that, under such an
approach, no representative of the state would have the opportunity to correct
the mistakes of a private decisionmaker.

The courts that refuse to treat arbitration agreements or awards respecting
child custody as binding can be divided into two groups. First, some courts
treat as void any contract to submit child custody or visitation issues to
arbitration and any arbitrator's award respecting child custody or visitation. 2
better suited to reach the ultimate objective" of protecting child's interests); Crutchley, 293
SE.2d at 793 (noting disadvantages of arbitration and that "parents cannot by agreement
deprive the court of its inherent and statutory authority to protect the interests of their children"); Pulfer v. Pulfer, 673 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (citing limited judicial
review of arbitration awards as reason why child custody should not be arbitrable).
50. See Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law FailsLesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.L 623, 632,642 (1996) (commenting that in custody cases,
"trial courts have broad discretion both as finders of facts and as assessors of the character and
needs of the individuals before the court[, and] ...[t]he guiding precedents often state principles only in general terms, like the best interests of the child" and noting consequent limited
nature of appellate review in custody cases); see also Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 903
(N.C.1998) ("Absent a total lack of substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings
[where the trial court is ruling in a custody case], such findings will not be disturbed on
appeal.").
51. Mdnookin, supra note 19, at 253-54.
52. See Lipsius v. Lipsius, 673 N.Y.S.2d 458,458-59 (App. Div. 1998) (explaining that
father did not waive his right to arbitrate issues concerning child support and attorney's fees by
litigating in court issues concerning child custody and visitation because such issues "are not
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Second, some courts treat an arbitrator's award respecting child custody or
visitation as merely voidable if the award does not serve the best interests of
the child.5
subject to arbitration"); Cohen v. Cohen, 600 N.Y.S.2d 996, 996-97 (App. Div. 1993) (refusing
to compel arbitration of custody before rabbinical tribunal because "[d]isputes over custody and
visitation are not subject to arbitration"); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740,742 (App. Div.
1993) (noting that "custody of and visitation with children must be added to this list [of issues
that are not to be arbitrated] because this subject, 'on its face' is inappropriate for resolution by
arbitration"); Agur v.Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772,777-78 (App. Div. 1969) (stating that agreement
for custody arbitration was void on facts of case); Rakoszynski v. Rakoszynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d
957, 959-60 (Sup. Ct 1997) (reviewing reasoning of earlier courts that have addressed this issue
and concluding that public policy has evolved such that child custody is no longer proper
subject of arbitration); Michelman v. Michelman, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608 (Sup. CL 1954)
(finding child visitation issues to be non-arbitrable); Hill v. Hill, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755, 758 (Sup.
Ct 1951) (explaining that child custody and visitation are not arbitrable and instead require
"determination upon ajudicial finding as to the best interests of the child"); Pulfer v. Pulfer, 673
N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that "matters of child custody may only be
decided by the trial court and are not subject to arbitration despite any agreement entered into
by the parties"); see also M.F.M. v. J.O.M., 889 S.W.2d 944, 947, 957 (Mo. Ct App. 1995)
(approving, in dicta, trial court's declaration that provision in agreement between two former
spouses in which they agreed to be bound by recommendation of two psychologists who would
serve as arbitrators of matters concerning care of their child was void).
53. See Kovacs v.Kovacs, 633 A,2d 425,431-32 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1993) (holding that
court "cannot adopt an arbitration award that concerns the beneficial interests of children
without first exercising independent judgment to determine whether the best interests of the
children are met by that award"); Sheets v. Sheets, 254 NXY.S.2d 320, 323 (App. Div. 1964)
(noting that "[tio the extent that such an [arbitration] award [concerning child custody]
conflicted with the best interests of the child, courts would treat it as a nullity insofar as the
child is concerned, irrespective of what binding effect it may have on the parents"); Lieberman
v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (noting that "upon [a] showing that a
provision of an award might be adverse to the best interest of a child (but not simply because
it 'affects' the child) the court may intervene"); Crutchley v. Crutchley, 293 S.E2d 793, 798
(N.C. 1982) (stating that "[j]ust as parents cannot by agreement deprive the courts of their duty
to promote the best interests of their children, they cannot do so by arbitration" and that "the
need for the court to protect the welfare of children outweighs the advantages of arbitration");

Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Pa. Super. Ct 1993) (noting "that arbitration
provisions regarding custody are not, as determined by the trial court, void as against public
policy" but rather "[a]n arbitration award on the issue of custody is subject to review by a court

of competent jurisdiction based upon its responsibility to look to the best interests of the child");
Patin v. Patin, 45 Va. Cir. 519, 520 (Cir. Ct 1998) (holding that court should "take[ ] into
account" arbitrator's award with respect to child custody but must not "simply enforce an
arbitrator's award without determining whether such an award is in the best interests of the
child"); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 802.12(3) and Judicial Council Note - 1993 (West 1994)
(codifying voidable approach to review of child custody arbitration awards); Faherty v. Faherty,
477 A.2d 1257, 1263 (NJ. 1984) (commenting, in dicta, that policy reasons supporting court's
finding that arbitration awards concerning child support are voidable if award is adverse to
substantial best interests of child "may be equally applicable to child custody and visitation
cases"); Kirshenbaum v. Kirshenbaum, 929 P.2d 1204,1207-08 (Wash. Ct.App. 1997) (holding
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A. The VoidApproach to Custody ArbitrationAgreements andAwards
The case of Glauber v. Glauber 4 typifies the position and analysis of
those courts that have found all arbitration contracts and awards respecting
child custody or visitation to be void.' The Glaubercourt reviewed a trial
court's ruling granting a father's motion to compel arbitration with his former
wife of a matter respecting the custody of their son. At the time of their
divorce, the father and mother had stipulated that any future disputes concerning the custody of their child would be brought before a named rabbi, whose
decision would be final and binding on the parents.' The parents' agreement
further provided that the father would take custody of their son no later than
at the time that the child reached the age of six years old. 7 Shortly after the
child's sixth birthday, the father demanded from the mother custody of their
son. 58 The mother, however, refused to allow the father to take physical
custody of the boy and sought in court a grant of permanent custody. 59 The
father then moved to compel arbitration ofthe custody matter before the rabbi,
pursuant to the parents' earlier stipulation, and the lower court granted his
motion. 60
The appeals court reversed the lower court's decision. The appeals court
first found that the broad arbitration agreement at issue would subject the
custody dispute to arbitration, absent a strong public policy objection.' The
court concluded, however, that child custody and visitation disputes
were "'on
62
[their] face' ... inappropriate for resolution by arbitration."
The Glauber court relied upon the settled law with respect to marital
separation agreements purporting to govern the custody and visitation rights
with respect to a couple's minor child.6 3 The dominant judicial approach
to the enforcement of such separation agreements provides that, although
such agreements "are, in the usual case, to be given priority," the court's
responsibility to safeguard the child's best interests supercedes any parental
that, under Washington's marriage dissolution act, trial court may properly delegate to arbitrator

power to suspend non-custodial parent's visitation rights, provided that suspended parent has
right to prompt court review of that decision).
54. 600 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 1993).
55. Glauber v. Glaubcr, 600 N.Y.SU2d 740 (App. Div. 1993).
56. See id. at 741 (noting that parents' stipulation survived divoreejudgment).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 742.
63. See id. at 742-43 (discussing case law on issue of arbitration agreements).
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agreement concerning child custody and visitation. 4 Therefore, under the
dominant approach, a separation agreement between parents of a minor child
concerning the custody of that child is never enforceable per se. 65 The Glau64. Id. at 742; see also Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384, 1389 (N.J. Super. Ct Ch.
Div. 1988) (explaining that agreement between parent and step-parent is "at best only a factor
to be considered in determining the visitation rights of a step-parent" because "[a] court under
its parenspatriaeauthority always has the duty and power to disregard agreements made by
parents relating to children"); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742-43 (App. Div. 1993)
("A court cannot be bound by an agreement as to... custody or visitation, and simultaneously
act as parenspatriaeon behalf of the child."); Lee E. Teitelbaum, FamilyHistory and Family
Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135,1156 (noting that as early as 1846, Now York Court of Chancery
refused to treat agreement between parents respecting custody of their child as binding on
grounds that court was charged by statute with protecting child). For an argument that courts
should enforce separation agreements for child custody as written except where the agreement
is likely to cause harm to the child, see David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules
for CustodyDisputes in Divorce, 83 MICIL L. REv. 477, 565-66 & n.323 (1984) (arguing that
because courts are "rarely in a better position" than are parents to determine what custody
arrangement is best for child, courts should not have power to disallow joint custody when
parents have agreed to it, and arguing more generally that "courts should stay out of decisions
both parents make about their children except when a strong probability of serious harm to the
child can be shown"); Mnookin, supra note 19, at 288 (arguing that parents' superior knowledge about their child's circumstances and desires, as compared to court's knowledge of child,
combined with "basic indeterminacy of anyone knowing what is best for the child" and benefits
of adopting solution agreed to by those who will have to carry it out, all militate in favor of
judicial enforcement of settlement agreements for child custody absent showing of likely harm
to child); and Mnookin & Kornhauser, supranote 40, at 957-58 (same).
65. See Garrison,supra note 23, at 861-62 (stating that separation agreement concerning
child custody is never enforceable per se). The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution require greater judicial deference to parental separation agreements
concerning child custody and visitation than does the dominant judicial approach to such
agreements, which allows a court to disregard a parental agreement that it finds is not in the best
interests of the child. Under the Principles, the court must adopt the parents' agreement
contained in a "parenting plan" unless the court finds that the agreement is not knowing or
voluntary or that the agreement would be harmful to the child. PRINCIPLES OF TBE LAW OF
FAMILY DIssOLunON: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.07 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part
I, 1998). Similarly, the Principles require that a court modify a parenting plan in accordance
with a parental agreement unless the court finds that the agreed to modification is not knowing
and voluntary or would be harmful to the child. Id. § 2.19. The drafters ofthe Principles reason
that many courts do not have the time or resources to give meaningful review to all parental
agreements with respect to child custody, that courts have difficulty obtaining information that
will demonstrate that a particular parental agreement is not in the child's best interests, and that
it might be futile for the court to attempt to impose a custody arrangement that the parents do
not want. Id § 2.07, cmt. a.
The dominant judicial approach to enforcement of premarital agreements concerning child
custody is the same as the dominant judicial approach concerning separation agreements
concerning child custody. See Brian Bix, Bargainingin the Shadow ofLove: The Enforcement
ofPremaritalAgreementsandHow We ThinkAboutMarriage,40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145,
148-49 n.12 (1998) (citing case law for proposition that "as a general rule, courts will not
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ber court concluded that "an agreement to arbitrate the issue of custody is
indistinguishable from an agreement to give custody,"' 6 and, therefore, an
agreement67by parents to submit the custody issue to arbitration could not bind
the court.
The Glaubercourt further expressed its disapproval of a two-step procedure whereby an arbitrator would first enter a child custody award, and a court
would then review that arbitraton award to ensure that it served the best
interests of the child. The court opined that such a process would inevitably
result in a "duplication of time, expense and effort" that would delay final
resolution of the custody issue and, in so doing, harm the child.'a For these
reasons, the court held that agreements between parents to arbitrate disputes
concerning the custody of minor children may not be enforced.69
enforce premarital agreements to the extent that they cover child custody, visitation, or child
care payments"). The American Law Instiftte's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
provide that a court should give less deference to a premarital agreement concerning child
custody than the court must give to a separation agreement respecting child custody. Compare
PmNCPLES OFTHELAWOFFAmiLYDISSOLuTION:ANALYSIS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS § 2.09(e)
(Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, 1998) (permitting court to deviate from Principles' presumptive
allocation of custodial responsibility that approximates amount of time that each parent spent
performing caretaking functions for child prior to fracture of family in light of pre-separation
custody agreement when "under the circumstances as a whole including the reasonable expectations of the parties and interests of the child, [it] would be appropriate to consider" such a
pre-separation agreement) with id. § 2.07(1) (requiring deference by court to separation agreement respecting child custody unless agreement is not knowing or voluntary, or agreement
would be harmfiul to child). The drafters of the Principles reason that "[p]re-separation
agreements are more remote in time, and circumstances are likely to have changed more substantially." Id. § 2.09, cmt L
In actuality, a court ordinarily will adopt a parental separation agreement respecting the
custody of the parents' minor child as its own order. See Chambers, supra note 64, at 565
(noting that courts "nearly always acquiesce in single-custody arrangements to which parents
agree"); Garrison, supra note 23, at 866 ("[C]ourts will seldom second-guess an agreement
between parents dealing with custody or support unless one of the parents later questions the
contract's capacity to meet the child's needs."); Inookin & Kormhauser, supra note 40, at 95455, 994-95 (noting that although parental separation agreement with respect to custody of minor
children cannot bind court "available evidence" indicates that "[t]ypically, separation agreements are rubber stamped [by the court] even in cases involving children" and concluding that
"[g]iven the resources devoted to the task of scrutinizing agreements, there is little reason to
believe that the process operates as much of a safeguard when there is no parental dispute to
catch the judge's attention"); PRINCPLES OFTHE LAW OF FAMILYDISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 207 cmt d (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part , 1998) ("Despite judicial rhetoric about the reviewability of [parenting] agreements, agreements are rarely rejected on any
grounds, at least on appeal.").
66. Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740,743 (App. Div. 1993).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Agur v. Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772,778 (App. Div. 1969)).
69. Id.
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B. The VoidableApproach to CustodyArbitrationAgreements andAwards
A seminal and typical case finding arbitration agreements and awards

with respect to child custody and visitation to be valid but voidable is Sheets
v. Sheets," in which the court concluded that "there seems to be no clear and
valid reason why the arbitration process should not be made available in the
area of custody and the incidents thereto, i.e., choice of schools, summer

camps, medical and surgical expenses, trips and vacations."

1

The Sheets

court, like the Glauber court, reasoned from the settled law with respect to
separation agreements that address child custody, noting that a court will
enforce such an agreement provided that the agreement is in the best interests
of the child.72 The Sheets court, however, unlike the
Glaubercourt, extended
73

this rule, as is, to the custody arbitration context.

Indeed, in considering what level of deference a court should give to an

arbitration agreement or award respecting child custody, many courts have
reasoned from the law governing separation contracts respecting child cus-

tody. They have concluded that, like such separation contracts, arbitration
contracts and awards for child custody should be given deference, but must
be subject to review by the court functioning as parens patriae to ensure
protection ofthe best interests of the child.1 4

70. 254 N.Y.S,2d 320 (App. Div. 1964).
71. Sheets v. Sheets, 254 N.Y.S-d 320,323 (App. Div. 1964).
72. id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425,431 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (stating
that custody and support arbitration agreements must be subject to court review). The Kovacs
court stated:
An agreement to arbitrate issues that concern the best interests of children, such as
custody and support is equivalent to an agreement on those matters. If parents
cannot bind the court by an agreement affecting the interests of their children, they
cannot bind the court by agreeing to let someone else, an arbitrator, make such a
decision for them.
Id.; see also, e.g., Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490,495 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (stating
that "an agreement between a husband and wife will be upheld so long as the agreement is
in the best interest of the children, however, the court retains supervisory power in its capacity
as 'parenspatriae'"); Crutchley v. Crutchley, 293 SE.2d 793, 798 (N.C. 1982) (reasoning
that "f]ust as parents cannot by agreement deprive the courts of their duty to promote the
best interests of their children, they cannot do so by arbitration" and stating that "provisions
of an arbitration award concerning custody and child support, like those provisions in a separation agreement, will remain reviewable and modifiable by the court"); Miller v. Miller, 620
A.2d 1161,1164-66 (Pa. Super. Ct 1993) (finding that "while agreements entered into between
parties are binding as between the parties, they may not bind the court once its jurisdiction is
invoked" and that court will function as'parenspatriae and determine best interests of child).
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Balanced against the state's duty as parenspatriaeto protect the child
are compelling reasons insupport of the state's giving respect to parental
autonomy. Courts commonly give several such reasons for the deference,
albeit limited, that they accord to separation agreements reached by parents
regarding the custody of their child. It is generally accepted that parents are
likely to know a great deal more about their child than the court is able to
learn through the adversarial process. 5 Moreover, the parents' love for their
child, it is thought, tends to produce agreements that are in the child's best
interests. 76 Further, amicable settlement of the custody issue promotes family
harmony, which is a good in itself.77 Finally, settlement or arbitration of a
custody dispute offers the opportunity for a speedy resolution of the matter. 8
The Sheets court held that when a court is presented with a challenge to
an arbitration award respecting the custody of a child, the court must examine
the ruling de novo. 9 In doing so, the court, depending uponthe circumstances
of the case, might rely solely upon the evidence adduced at the arbitration
hearing, might disregard that evidence entirely and call for new proof, or
might rely both upon the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing as well
as upon new evidence presented to the court.8 ' After review of the relevant
evidence, the court then must determine whether or not the arbitration award
conflicts with the best interests of the child. 1
The Sheets court conceded that, in some circumstances, its two-step
approach - arbitration followed by de novo court review - might result in
"duplication in effort."82 However the court also pointed to other circumstances in which an arbitrator's decision could not possibly adversely affect
75.

See Miller, 620 A.2d at 1164 (Citing Sally Burnett Sharp,Modification ofAgreement

68 VA. L. REV. 1263,1280 (1982)).
Based Custody Decrees: UnitaryorDualStandard?,
76. Id.

77.

Id; see also Masters v. Masters, 513 A.2d 104, 113 (Conn. 1986) (commenting that

arbitration of custody proceedings might offer disputants "amuted adversarial tone').
78. See Masters, 513 A2d at 113 (noting that arbitration offers "aspeedy resolution of
the issues"); Spencer v. Spencer, 494 A.2d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that both
separation agreements and arbitration agreements allow parties "to settle their disputes without
court intervention, with speed, economy, and substantial finality"); Crutchley,293 S.E2d at 796
(noting speed and finality as advantages of arbitration of domestic disputes).
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution call for greater
scrutiny by the court of any parental agreement concerning custody where there is credible
information of child abuse or domestic abuse. PRINCIm S OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOmmmATIONS §§ 2.06(2) & 2.07(2) (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I,
1998).
79. Sheets v. Sheets, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320,324 (App. Div. 1964).
80. Id.at 324.
81. Id.at 323,325.
82. Id. at 325.
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the best interests of the child and, therefore, could not be used to invoke de
novo review by the court.83 The court listed as examples of such rulings that
a parent visit with the child on one particular day of the week rather than
another particular day, that the child be accompanied to school by a parent,
and that the child attend a summer camp in the mountains rather than attend
a summer camp at sea level.84
C. The Minority JudicialView That ChildCustodyArbitration
Agreements andAwards Bind the Court
A rare departure from the almost universal holding that an arbitration
agreement or award respecting child custody or visitation does not bind the
court is found inthe Michigan Court of Appeals case ofDickv. Dick. 5 Leslie
Dick and Linda Dick had been married for two and one-halfyears and had had
one child together, a son, when Mr. Dick filed for divorce."6 The Dicks then
agreed to submit all issues relating to the fracture of their family, including
their disputes relating to child custody and child support, to binding arbitration.87 At that time, the trial court entered an order providing for such binding
arbitration and appointing an arbitrator to hear and resolve the case.8 8
More than two years later, the arbitrator issued an opinion and award of
custody to Mrs. Dick, which opinion included findings of fact regarding the
"best interests of the child" factors as set out in Michigan law. 9 Thereafter,
83. Id. at 324.
84. Id.
85. 534N.W.2d 185 (Mich. Ct.App. 1995). The American Law Institute's Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution allow parents to agree to binding arbitration of a custody dispute

that arises after entry of an initial custody order. Section 2.06(3Xc) of the Principles requires

that a parenting plan contain a provision governing resolution of future disputes that might arise
under the plan. PRNcIPS OF TBE LAW oFFAMILYDISSOLUTION: ANALYsIs AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 206(3Xc) (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part , 1998). Section 2.11(2) of the Principles
provides that
[i]fthe parents have agreed in a parenting plan or by agreement thereafter to a binding resolution of their dispute by non-judicial means, a decision by such means is
binding upon the parents and must be enforced by the court, unless it is shown to be
manifestly harmful to the child's interests, beyond the scope of the parents' agreement, or the result of fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other serious irregularity.
Id. § 211(2). Thus, "[a] decision reached as a result of procedures agreed to by the parents is
reviewable only on grounds that would have been sufficient to set the agreement aside, such as
whether it is harmful to the child, or under the standard generally applied to third-party
arbitration outcomes .... ."Id. § 211, cmt c.
86. Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185,187 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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the trial court entered ajudgment of divorce that fully incorporated the arbitrator's rulings.' Mr. Dick then filed an appeal attacking the validity of the
arbitration agreement. He argued "that arbitration is not an acceptable procedure for resolving issues of child custody and support."91 Mr. Dick sought to
start over again from scratch in the trial court.'
The Michigan Court of Appeals began its analysis ofthe custody arbitrability issue by taking note of the case law that reflected the view that "custody
decisions are the exclusive province of the circuit court."' 3 The court then
"balance[d]" this case law against Michigan's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which provided that "all persons, except infants and persons of
unsound mind, may, by an instrument in writing, submit to the decision of 1
or more arbitrators, any controversy existing between them, which might be
the subject of a civil action, except as herein otherwise provided."'4 The court
found that " It]he language of the arbitration statute is broad and seemingly all
inclusive. It permits all persons to submit any controversy to arbitration upon
their agreement. It does not specifically exempt any civil action from binding
arbitration. Thus, . . . custody disputes are not exempted from arbitration."I
Further, the court found no other statute that prohibited child custody arbitration.' In sum, the court held "we find no clear prohibition in case law, court
rule, or statute against the use of binding arbitration in the resolution of
custody disputes. Binding arbitration is an acceptable and appropriate method
of dispute resolution in cases where the parties agree to it."'7
Notably, the Dick opinion focused almost exclusively on a statutory
interpretation of Michigan's arbitration law. Moreover, the court's analysis
was formulaic. The opinion is remarkable in that, in departing from the large
body of case law that has held that a court's parenspatriaeduties supercede
the right of parents to contract for arbitration of their custody dispute, the
court failed to critique that case law meaningfilly (indeed, at all), and did not
discuss the state's parenspatriaeduties or how arbitration might or might not
adequately protect the interests of the child.' The Dick opinion, therefore,
90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93. Id. at 189.
94. Id. (quoting MCIL Cole. LAWS § 600.5001 (1968)).
95. Id. at 190.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 190-91.
98. The refusal by almost all courts to defer to arbitration agreements and awards purporting to govern child custody is in contrast to the clear majority position holding that arbitration agreements respecting property division and spousal support upon divorce are enforceable.
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Generally, a court will treat a contract for arbitration of property and spousal support issues as
binding, absent grounds for invalidating the contract that might apply to any arbitration
contract, and will enforce an arbitration award on such matters, absent grounds for overturning
the award that might apply to any arbitration award. See Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425, 432
(Md. Ct Spec. App. 1993) (holding that arbitration award concerning custody is voidable but
arbitration award concerning property issues and alimony is "appropriate to be adopted without
further consideration"); Faherty v. Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. 1984) (holding that
parties may bind themselves to arbitrate spousal support); irsch v. irsch, 333 N.E.2d 371,
374 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that agreement to allow arbitrator to determine spouse's spousal
support obligations did not violate public policy); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743
(App. Div. 1993) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement with respect to child custody while
commenting, in dicta, that spousal support and child support are arbitrable issues); Crutchlcy
v. Crutchley, 293 S.E.2d 793, 797-98 (N.C. 1982) (finding that arbitration may be binding on
questions of spousal support, but is reviewable as to child custody and support); Elizabeth A.
Jenkins, Annotation, Validity andConstruction ofProvisionsforArbitrationofDisputesas to
Alimony or Support Payments or Child Visitation or Custody Matters, 38 A.L.R. 5th 69, 69
(1996) ("Courts are willing to enforce arbitration agreements between spouses when the issues
to be arbitrated concern alimony or spousal support.").
Some courts have justified the difference in levels of judicial deference accorded to
arbitration agreements respecting property division and spousal support as contrasted with
arbitration agreements respecting child custody by reference to the view that an agreement to
arbitrate custody, unlike an agreement to arbitrate property and spousal support issues, strongly
implicates the interests of a child who is not party to the arbitration agreement See Patin v.

Patin, 45 Va. Cir. 519, 520 (Cir. Ct 1998) ("Whereas an agreement to arbitrate disputes
involving spousal support and property involve only the interests of the parties to such an
agreement, the arbitration of child custody involves more than the interests of the parents. In
custody decisions, the interest ofthe child is paramount") Moreover, and somewhat relatedly,
although spouses have the right upon divorce to settle conclusively by contract their property
rights and support obligations to each other, divorcing parents generally do not have the right
under present law to settle conclusively by contract the custody arrangements respecting their
children. See Fahery, 477 A.2d at 1262-63 (noting that divorcing spouses have greater
autonomy with respect to settlement of property and spousal support issues as contrasted with
settlement of child support and custody issues and holding that arbitration agreements with
respect to child support should be subject to greater level ofjudicial review than agreements to
arbitrate property and spousal support issues); Crutchley, 293 S.E.2d at 797 (reasoning that
"[s]ince the parties may settle spousal support by agreement, there exists no prohibition to their
entering into binding arbitration" with respect to spousal support).
Given that agreements to arbitrate child support issues also strongly and directly implicate
the interests of a child who is not a party to the arbitration agreement, one might expect that
courts would group arbitration agreements respecting child support with those respecting child
custody, and subject such agreements to a higher level of review than arbitration agreements for
property division and spousal support receive. Most courts that have addressed the issue have
followed this reasoning and have held that arbitration awards of child support should be subject
to a high level ofjudicial review. See Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 437 (holding that lower court erred
in adopting decision of Beth Din concerning child support "without the exercise of independent
discretion.. . that is required of rulings affecting the best interests of children"); Faherty,477
A.2d at 1262-63 (finding that "courts have a nondelegable, special supervisory function in the
area of child support that may be exercised upon review of an arbitrator's award"). The Faherty
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contributes little or nothing to a study of what the law should be with respect
to the enforcement of child custody arbitratibn awards.
I. The Academic Commentary on ChildCustody and
VisitationArbitration
Academic commentators long have asserted certain supposed virtues of
child custody and visitation arbitration.' These claimed benefits of custody
arbitration generally relate to either savings oftime and money for the custody
Court went on to hold that
whenever the validity of an arbitration award affecting child support is questioned
on the grounds that it does not provide adequate protection for the child, the trial
court... should conduct a de novo review unless it is clear on the face of the award
that the award could not adversely affect the substantial best interests of the child.
Id.; see also Schneider v. Schneider, 216 N.E.2d 318, 320-21 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that
arbitration award for child support is binding "only insofar as the award did not adversely affect
the substantial interest ofthe child" (quoting Sheets v. Sheets, 254 N.Y.S2d 320,320-21 (App.
Div. 1964))); Rakoszynski v. Rakoszynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d 957,960-61 (Sup. CL 1997) (holding
that child custody is never arbitrable, and refusing to confirm arbitration award of Beth Din for
child support because Beth Din issuing award had failed to provide explanation as to how it had
arrived at award and because award was not in best interests of children); Fence v. Fence, 314
N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1020-21 (N.Y. Fain. CL 1970) (noting precedent calling into question
arbitrability of custody disputes and holding that, "in the instant ease, the custody of the
children, their welfare, and their support are so inextricably interrelated that the need for a
judicial process to determine all issues seems clearly indicated under the doctrine of parens
patriae"); Crutchley, 293 SE.2d at 797 (applying to arbitration awards for child support
reasoning that is used to justify court review of any separation agreement for child support);
Kelm v. Kelm, 623 NXE2d 39, 42-43 (Ohio 1993) (holding that parties may agree to arbitrate
matters of temporary spousal support and child support but "if the arbitration process fails in
any respect to protect the interest of a child or spouse, trial courts have the authority to use...

their contempt powers to ensure that the process is accomplished in an expeditious, efficient,
and reasonable manner").
Other courts, however, have hold that arbitration awards for child support generally are

not subject to heightened judicial review. See, e.g., Masters v. Masters, 513 A.2d 104, 113
(Conn. 1986) (reasoning that child support determinations do not require "delicate balancing
of the factors composing the best interests of the child" and therefore, may be resolved with
finality through arbitration); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (Sup. Ct. 1991)
(holding that "a dispute over child support is one between the custodial and non-custodial
parent and can be agreed upon contractually or by arbitration").
99. See, e.g., Joan F. Kessler et al., WhyArbitrateFamilyLawMatters?,14. AM. AcAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 333, 336-40 (1997) (discussing benefits of matrimonial arbitration);
Lawrence S. Kubie, Provisionsfor the Care of Children ofDivorcedParents: A New Legal
Instrument,73 YAI.EL.. 1197, 1198 (1964) (proposing thatif parents cannot agree on question
relating to their child, "they agree to submit the issue to a committee which they themselves
choose at the time they make the agreement, and to accept unconditionally the committee's
decision, and to be guided by i").
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claimants, or "better" decisionmaking and increased participant satisfaction
arising from expertise on the part of the decisionmaker. °°
For example, commentators have claimed, generally without providing
empirical support, that arbitration of custody matters would allow the parties
to resolve their custody and visitation disputes more quickly and with less
monetary expense as compared to resolution throughthe public courts."' The
purported speedy resolution of custody matters through arbitration itself, it has
been asserted, would benefit the child who is at the center of the custody
dispute by reducing the length of time she must live with heightened conflict

and uncertainty concerning her future custody and visitation arrangements.
Commentators also have theorized that the characteristics of the arbitration process might lessen conflict between the competing claimants for custody and visitation as compared to the litigation process inthe public courts. 3
100. Commentators generally have ignored the benefits that might arise from the disputants' ability to create or select their own law in custody arbitration. But see Stephen W.
Schlissel,A Proposalfor FinalandBindingArbitrationofInitialCustodyDeterminations,26
FAM L.Q. 71, 72 (1992) (noting that contractual nature of arbitration allows divorcing couple
to stipulate to arbitration procedures, rules of evidence and applicable law).
101. See Kessler et al., supra note 99, at 333, 337 (asserting that "[b]ecause a matter
submitted to arbitration usually results in a quick hearing and award, the costs of the decisionmaking process are greatly reduced"); Frank L. McGuane, Jr., ModelMaritalArbitrationAct:.
A Proposal,14 J.AM. ACAD. MATPIMONIAL LAW. 393,395 (1997) (deeming arbitration "ideal
alternative" to cost and complexity of courts); Melissa Douthart Philbrick, Agreements to
ArbitratePost-DivorceCustodyDisputes, 18 COLUM. JL. & Soc. PROBS. 419, 442-43 (1985)
(noting arbitration's "reduced costs, informality, and speedy resolutions"); Schlissel, supra note
100, at 72, 75, 77 (noting contrast in cost and speed between litigation and arbitration); Note,
Committee Decision of Child Custody Disputes and the JudicialTest of "BestInterests," 73
YALE L.J. 1201, 1201 (1964) (noting "probable saving to courts of time, money, and resources
and the similar savings gained by parents" as "one of the more obvious merits" of arbitration);
see also Spencer & Zamnit, supra note 36, at 924-25 n.53 (providing empirical evidence of
speed with which domestic relations arbitrations are resolved).
102. See Kessler et al., supra note 99, at 337 ("The swiftness of the process may also
reduce the time in which children are victims of the stress and tension occasioned by lack of
certainty as to the outcome."); Philbrick, supra note 101, at 424-25, 443 (asserting that "[t]he
prolonged conflict that [a long delay between filing for custody modification and final judgment] engenders, in and of itself; runs contrary to the best interests of the children"); Spencer
& Zamnnit, supra note 36, at 919 (claiming that quick resolution of custody dispute through
alternative dispute resolution can remove uncertainty harmfu to child).
103. See RICHARD A. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUATION iN CH]LD CUSTODY MEDIATION,
ARBrrRATION, AND ITIGATION

31 (1989) (arguing that his proposed mediation/arbitration

procedure for resolving custody disputes "would protect clients from the polarization and
spiraling of animosity that frequently accompanies the utilization of adversafial procedures and
contributes to the development and perpetuation of psychopathology"); Thomas E. Carbonneau,
A ConsiderationofAlternatives to Divorce Litigation, 1986 U. IL. L. Rsv. 1119, 1165-66
(hypothesizing that "[p]rocedural and substantive flexibility and privacy [of divorce arbitration]
should lessen overt animosity, allowing for a quicker and less costly resolution of the disputes");

CONTRACTBVG FOR CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONMAK1NG

1169

The hypothesis is generally that "[p]rocedurally, an arbitration proceeding's
adversarial tone is muted bythe informal setting and short timetables, thereby
minimizing the potential for increased antagonism and escalated conflict.""°
Numerous commentators have pointed out that arbitration allows the
parties to the custody and visitation dispute to select a decisionmaker with
expertise that the parties themselves find relevant and believe to be beneficial.' This expertise might relate to several categories ofknowledge. First,
the parties might choose an arbitrator because of her interest in, and knowledge of; the field of the law relating to the break-up of the family."° In addition, the parties might select a child custody and visitation decisionmaker

because of her general expertise in child psychology or family counseling. '°7
The parties also might select a decisionmaker because of her familiarity with
the particular family that is experiencing the custody dispute."es Finally, the
Schlissel, supra note 100, at 72, 74-75, 77 (hypothesizing that arbitration's informality leads
to "increased acceptance of results, which in turn is conducive to a spirit of future goodwill
between the parties").
104. Phlbricksupranote 101,at443.
105. See, e.g., Kessler et al., supra note 99, at 336-37 (identifying ability to choose judge
as "a principal benefit of the arbitration alternative"); Mary Kay Kisthardt, The Use of Mediation andArbitrationfor Resolving Family Conflicts: What Lawyers ThinkAbout Them, 14 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONEAL LAW. 353,354,391 (1997) (reporting on 1996 survey of members
of American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers in which respondents "cited the ability to choose
the decisionmaker as the greatest advantage of arbitration [of family disputes]" and characterized arbitrators who were chosen as "more specialized and sensitive to the needs of the case"
and "more experienced and better than some judges"); Schlissel, supranote 100, at 76 (noting
advantage of choosing decisionmaker experienced on matter); Daniel J.Guttman, Note, For
Better or Worse, TiIIADR Do Us Part UsingAntenuptialAgreementsto CompelAlternatives
to TraditionalAdversarialLitigation,12 OEIIO ST. 3.ONDISP. RESOL. 175,183 (1996) (noting
enhanced likelihood of acceptance and compliance, as well as optimal qualifications of mutually
elected decisionmaker).
106. See Kessler et al., supra note 99, at 337 (commenting that "matrimonial arbitration
permits the parties to select someone who has chosen to be intensely involved in the field of
divorce and has developed both an interest and expertise in that area"); Schlissel, supra note
100, at 77 (noting that "arbitration permits the parties to select someone who has chosen to be
intensely involved in the field of child custody determinations and who has developed an
expertise in that area").
107. See Carbonneau, supra note 103, at 1166 (noting potential benefit to parties from
psychological training and expertise of arbitrators); Kubie, supra note 99, at 1198 (suggesting
that parents choose for their child dispute resolution committee "a pediatrician, a child psychiatrist or child analyst, an educator and/or an impartial lawyer or clergyman").
108. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 289 (hypothesizing that "[i]f the disputing parents
could agree on the choice of a 'judge' and the 'judge' knew the family, the custody decision
might better reflect an intuitive appreciation of the parties' values, psychology, and goals");
Note, supra note 101, at 1201 (suggesting that arbitrator's personal knowledge of parents and
child involved in custody dispute might make her more competent to adjudicate custody dispute).
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parties might select a particular arbitrator because she is knowledgeable about
and respectful of the values that the parties hold dear or the culture that the
parties have lived in.'"
Commentators have argued that allowing the parties to selectthe decisionmaker for their custody dispute would increase the likelihood that the parties

will respect and comply with the decisionmaker's judgments:'

"If [the

parties to the custody dispute] have some choice in selecting the arbitrator,
then each party will have endorsed the adjudicator from the outset and will be
less likely to criticize the decision.""'
Much of the academic commentary in the area of custody and visitation
arbitration has focused onthe relationship between: (1) the purported virtues
of custody arbitration, and relatedly, the interests promoted by according
finality to a custody arbitration award, and (2) the asserted need for the state
to protect the interests of the child who is the focus of such an arbitration
award. The need to serve the dual goals of finality and child protection has
seemed to some to present a classic catch-22." 2 On the one hand, commentators have noted that the de novo review standard dominant in the case law
undermines many of the virtues of custody arbitration."' Absent some
109. See Anne E. Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce
Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 467, 469 (1979) (asserting that parties to domestic
dispute might wish to utilize mediation or arbitration to avoid "a judge [who] may be unable to
relate to litigants who have life styles different from the middle class American norm"); Janet
Maleson Spencer & Joseph P. Zammit, Reflections on Arbitration Under the Family Dispute
Services, 32 ARB. J. 111, 119 (1977) (noting that arbitration "permits the parties to choose an
arbitrator who shares their values, a parent surrogate who attempts to make the decision that
they would make absent their present hostility"); see also Spitko, supra note 11, at 294-97
(asserting that "[a]rbitration can empower cultural minorities by providing a forum for adjudication in which the decision-maker is selected because she understands and appreciates the
minority culture at issue").
110. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 289 (hypothesizing that with agreed upon judge,
"[t]he decision might also be more acceptable to the parents"); Philbrick, supranote 101, at 434
(noting that "participation in the selection of the arbitrator-adjudicator may increase the likelihood that the parties will respect his or her findings and lessens the coercive nature of the judgement"); Schlissel, supra note 100, at 77 (hypothesizing that "[c]onfidence in the trier of facts
can go a long way towards reducing the anger of the participants").
111.
Philbricksupra note 101,at444.
112. See Guttman, supra note 105, at 183 (arguing that "[e]xcessive [judicial] review
would jeopardize the reasons arbitration was sought in the first place [but] too little review may
lead to unjust decisions being upheld when, in the interests ofjustice and persons not directly
involved in the process (i.e., children of the failed marriage), they should not be upheld").
113. See Carbonneau, supranote 103, at 1157 (commenting that"[e]xcessive reviewwould
jeopardize the viability and autonomy of the arbitral process"); Kessler et al., supra note 99, at
338, 344 (noting argument that custody arbitration becomes less attractive alternative to parties
to extent that parties face prospect of litigating custody dispute twice); Joseph T. McLaughlin,
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significant degree of finality, custody arbitration awards are less likely to save
time and resources." 4 Moreover, the arbitrator's much desired expertise
would seem to be of little utility if the reviewing court is free to disregard the
arbitrator's opinion.
On the other hand, some commentators have echoed the concerns dominant in the case law that arbitration agreements entered into by the parents of
a fractured family might not adequately protect the interests ofthe children of
that family.1 5 Of particular concern is the fear that an arbitrator in a child
custody and visitation dispute is not obligated to follow the law and might
well not follow the law." 6 From these concerns has arisen the view that the
state may not ensure that it properly carries out its parenspatriaefunction of
safeguarding the child's welfare unless it subjects all arbitration awards
respecting child custody and visitation to heightened judicial review. To
some, therefore, it has seemed that in order to save custody arbitration, we
must destroy it, or at least severely impair its utility.'n
Arbitrabiliy.: Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 930 (1996) ("The
general rule prohibiting binding arbitration in child custody and support disputes has prompted
some legal commentators to question the advantage of arbitration in this context In their view,
the perceived speed, economy, and substantial justice of arbitration will remain illusory unless
courts give the arbitrator's decision binding effect."); Schlissel, supra note 100, at 79 ("If the
arbitration of a custody dispute is not final and binding, but is subject to de novo review by a
court, then such arbitration loses much of its attractiveness."); Christine Albano, Comment,
BindingArbitration: A ProperForumfor Child Custody?, 14 3. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 419, 428-29 (1997) ("The purpose of reaching a quicker and less expensive resolution
through arbitration is seriously undermined if the judge ultimately refuses to sign off on the
arbitration decision.").
114. See McGuane, supra note 101, at 402 ("If a party has the option ... [of] a complete
new trial before a judge, it is hard to imagine why parties would select [the option of arbitration]."); Philbrick, supra note 101, at 446 ("The more eager a court is to reconsider arbitrated
issues, the more arbitration becomes merely an additional, perfunctory step in the dispute
resolution process - lengthening and complicating the procedure.").
115. See Nancy Ann Holman & Jane NolandAgreementandArbitration:Relief to OverLitigationin DomesticRelationsDisputesin Washington, 12 WILLAMETrEL. REV. 527,534-35
(1976) (commenting that judicial hostility to arbitration of custody disputes arises from court's
sense of duty to guard welfare of child). See generallv Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceabilit of
Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examinationof the PublicPolicy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV.
481 (1981) (discussed infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text).
116. See Kessler et al, supra note 99, at 339-40 (noting also, however, that parties "can
agree that an arbitrator wil be bound by the substantive law of the state").
117. See, e.g., Kenneth J.RigbyAlternateDisputeResolution,44 LA. L. REV. 1725,175152 (1984) (concluding that appropriate balancing of competing interests involved requires that
"all third-party decisions respecting the welfare of the child" must be subject to judicial review

to ensure that they are not detrimental to the child's best interests (footnote omitted)); Sterk,
supra note 115, at 484, 486 (suggesting that objections he raises to custody arbitration could
be obviated by requiring that arbitrators be bound by law, be required to state reasons for their
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Professor Stewart Sterk has set forth a thoughtful argument against
binding child custody arbitration.' Professor Sterk's critique is grounded on
the broad principle that "[p]ublic policy should be invoked to prevent arbitration when at issue is a legislative expression or a basic case law principle

designed for some purpose other than to foster justice between the parties to
the dispute.1'1 9 He cites antitrust law, which he notes is "designed to produce
economic effects that often have little to do with the immediate needs of the
contracting parties," as an example of such a legislative expression. 20 Professor Sterk asserts that an arbitrator who is contractually bound to work justice
between the parties "cannot be expected to sacrifice the most equitable
resolution of the dispute between the parties in favor of the economic needs
of society as expressed in the antitrust laws."'
Therefore, Professor Sterk
argues, contracts to arbitrate future disputes arising out of antitrust law should
not be enforceable.1 2
conclusions, and be subject to judicial review, but such process "would no longer resemble
arbitration as it has developed in this country, and no longer offer many of the advantages for
which arbitration is known"); ef Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitrationand the Goals ofEmployment DiscriminationLaw, 56 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 395,447-56 (1999) (discussing ways in
which broadening judicial review of employment discrimination arbitration awards might make
arbitration more effective at ending discrimination but also would increase cost of arbitration
to point that it could make arbitration inaccessible to employees who need it most).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Sterk, supra note115, at 483.
Id.at483.
Id.
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 503, 511 (commenting that most convincing rationale forthen "well established"

rule that public policy prohibits enforcement of agreements to arbitrate fiture disputes concerning antitrust laws "is simply that the antitrust laws are designed not to protect either of the
contracting parties from overreaching by the other, but instead to promote competition in the
economic system").
Subsequent to the publication of Professor Sterk's article, the United States Supreme
Court held that, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, antitrust claims arising in the international context are arbitrable, notwithstanding the public interest in enforcement of federal
antitrust laws. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640
(1985). Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the arbitrability of antitrust claims
arising in the domestic context, the lower courts that have addressed the issue consistently have
held that such domestic antitrust claims are arbitrable. See N.Y. Cross Harbor R.R. Terminal
Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 70, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that lower courts
"have consistently interpreted the Mitsubishi holding expansively and have consequently
subjected anti-trust claims arising from domestic transactions to arbitration"); see also Kotam
Elec., Inc. v. JBL Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F3d 724, 728 (1 th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (holding
that "arbitration agreements concerning domestic antitrust claims are enforceable"); Nghiem v.
NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Hough v. Merrill Lynch, 757
F. Supp. 283,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affdwithoutop., 946 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
reasoning of Mitsubishi "should apply with equal force to domestic claims").
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Professor Sterk concludes, however, that agreements to arbitrate existing
antitrust disputes should be enforceable." z He notes that Congress permits the

private settlement of existing antitrust disputes without state intervention and,
in so doing, consents to the subordination of antitrust public policy to the
promotion of justice between the parties. 24 Professor Sterk argues that in
light of this "[tihere would seem to be little reason... not to penmit the parties
to submit to private
arbitrators those disputes that they could settle by private
25
agreement."'
Professor Sterk analyzes custody arbitration under this framework. First,
he points out that the principal focus of child custody statutes is the promotion
of the welfare of children rather than the satisfaction of parental needs.126
Professor Sterk argues that "tthe mechanism of arbitration" is "at cross purposes" with this principal focus on the welfare of a child. 1' The principal
focus of a custody arbitration, Professor Sterk asserts, is likely to be justice
between the parties to the arbitration agreement.128 The child, however, is not
a party to the arbitration agreement.'" Therefore, Professor Sterk concludes,
123. Stork, supranote 115, at 507-08.
124. Id.at508.
125. Id; see also Ware, supra note 11, at 727-29 (arguing that post-dispute arbitration
agreements concerning rights arising out of mandatory rules should be enforced but pro-dispute
arbitration agreements concerning such rights either should not be enforced or arbitration
awards arising from such agreements should be subject to de novo judicial review of arbitrator's
legal claims).
126. Stork, supra note 115, at 483.
127. Id. at483, 499-502.
128. Id. at 503 ("The arbitration process is designed not to further the child's best interest,
but rather to resolve the dispute between the parents.").
129. Id. at 499-500. Professor Sterk asserts that, because the child is not a party to the
arbitration agreement, she "can no more be bound by the agreement or a subsequent arbitration
award than any third party can be bound by an agreement between two others." Id. The
proposition that a parent may not bind her child to an arbitration agreement is questionable.
There is authority for the view that, in her role as guardian of the unemancipated child, a parent
has the authority to grant her child's consent to arbitration, thereby binding the child to the
arbitration agreement See Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965) (holding that "the
power to enter into a contract for medical care that binds the child to arbitrate any dispute
arising thereunder is implicit in a parent's right and duty to provide for the cam of his child");
Pictrelli v. Peacock, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 690-91 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that parent had
authority, arising from her rights as her child's guardian, to bind her child and did bind her child
to arbitrate claims arising from child's health care treatment even though child had not yet been
conceived at time that parent signed arbitration agreement).
More importantly, this line of attack on custody arbitration misunderstands the nature of
child custody adjudication and, relatedly, overlooks the inherent inequality of the parent-child
relationship. A child generally is not a party to a custody determination concerning her in public
court, nor generally is she represented by counsel in such proceedings. See In re Marriage of
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the arbitration may do justice between the parties while failing to protect the
child's welfare. 130 Ilndeed, Professor Sterk points out, not only is the arbitrator
free to ignore the best interests of the child, but the arbitrator may lack the
contractual power to promote the best interests of the child in cases in which
neither parent is a suitable custodian: Even ff the arbitrator were to conclude
that a third party would be the best custodian for the child, the arbitrator is
likely to lack the power to award custody or visitation rights to a third party
13 1
who is not a party to the arbitration agreement entered into by the parents.
Finally, Professor Sterk points out that, unlike the parties to an agreement
to arbitrate an existing antitrust dispute, the parents involved in a custody
dispute are not free to settle the dispute conclusively. Professor Sterk argues
that this state of the law strongly militates against the enforceability of custody arbitration agreements and awards. Echoing the case law, Professor
Sterk writes:
The principal issue involved is whether public policy prohibits arbitrators
from conclusively resolving supportand custody disputes. Ifparents could
conclusively resolve disputes over custody and child support by private
agreement, there wouldbe no reasonto prohibitresolution ofsuch disputes
by arbitrators; a matter which society is content to leave entirely to private
agreement is one that may be referred by private agreement to arbitration.
The principle is basic whenever public policy forms the basis of an objection to enforcing an arbitration agreement.
Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 670-76 (Colo. 1994) (en bane) (holding that although child has statutory
right to have determination of her custody be based upon her best interests, child has no right
to participate through chosen counsel in proceeding concerning her custody); Miller v. Miller,
677 A.2d 64, 66-68 (Me. 1996) (holding that children have no common law or constitutional
right to intervene in divorce action of their parents as parties with attorney of their choice);
Schneider v. Schneider, 216 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that statute precluding any
"[a]rbitration of controversy involving [an] infant" not applicable to arbitration for child support
because "[a]li the authorities seem to say that a cause of action for payments like these for a child
belongs not to the child but to the mother"); Mnookin, supra note 19, at 254-55 (pointing out
that while child is person most affected by custody adjudication, she is not participant in
proceeding). The custody proceeding determines the obligations and rights of a child's parents
who, in their role as parents, have authority over the child necessary to implement the custody
award - that is, to "bind" the child to the award. In choosing not to make the child a necessary
party in the custody adjudication concerning her, the state recognizes that a child generally has
a limited (and inferior) capacity for making certain judgments, even though those judgments
might profoundly affect her welfare. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Famil
Privacy?, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1207,1222 (1999) (arguing that given child's incapacity to
make certain judgments, parent-child relationship inherently is not one of equality but one of
responsibility of parent for child and "should be considered outside of the equality paradigm").
130. Sterk, supra note 115, at 500 ("Justice between the parties thus may not be inthe best
interests of the child.").
131.

Id.
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[H]owever, parents cannot by private agreement place the level of a
minor child's support beyond the reviewing power of courts. The rule
regarding parents' custody agreements is even stronger. Such agreements
are not binding on the courts. Instead, the court as parenspatriaemust
make support and custody decisions in the best interest of the children
involved, despite any contrary agreement of the parents.'32
In sum, Professor Sterk concludes that:
[i]t is the inability to represent properly the interests of the child, who, of
course, never consented to arbitrationinthe first place, that makes arbitration an inappropriate forum for resolution of custody disputes. Because
justice between the parties to the arbitration agreement is an insignificant
factor in making a custody award, arbitrators should not be permitted to
make such determinations.13
Other academic commentators have been less willing entirely to abandon
custody arbitration at the altar of the child's "best interests." Instead, they
have struggled to devise an approach that would provide a way out of the
catch-22 and would accord some finality to an arbitrator's child custody award
while also safeguarding the interests of the child who is at the center of the

custody dispute.
Some commentators have argued that procedural safeguards can ensure
that the interests of the child who is at the center of a custody arbitration are
adequately protected to the extent that de novo review is not necessary to
protect those interests."' Melissa Douthart Philbrick, for example, has called
for "child-centered arbitration" that would avoid de novo review.13 She
explains the general idea: "Ifthe parents agree to a procedurally fair arbitration
process, these courts could be assured thattheirparenspatriaeoversight was
unnecessary. There would then be no need for de novo review and no fear of
the attendant potential for the abuse of arbitration as atactic for delay."' 36
Philbrick proposes arbitration in which the arbitrator is contractually
required to decide custody and visitation matters based on the child's best
interests. 37 The contract also would directthe arbitrator to conduct independent fact finding to ascertain the child's interests and to disclose those find132.

Id. at 494.

133.

Id. at 502.

134. See generallyMcGuane, supra note 101; Philbrick, supra note 101.
135. Philbrick, supra note 101, at 452-61.
136. Id. at451.
137. Id. at 453-54; see also Kessler et al., supra note 99, at 339-40 (noting that parties
contracting for custody arbitration have power to bind arbitrator to follow substantive law of
state); Albano, supra note 113, at 443 (arguing that to ensure protection of child's interests,
arbitration custody award must comply with state and local law).
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ings. 13 Finally, the contract would permit the arbitrator to appoint counsel to

represent the child's interests where the arbitrator found that the child's
interests were adverse to the interests of the parents. 39 Philbrick asserts that
"[t]he attorney for the child will also help focus the inquiry on what would be
beneficial to that child, rather than on what each parent would prefer. Independent representation would thus
ensure that the child's best interests are
40
advocated."'
and
fully explored
Philbrick proposes that a court reviewing an arbitrator's custody award
should first determine if the arbitration agreement provided for "child-centered" arbitration as she has outlined it.'4' If the court determines that the
arbitration agreed to is procedurally satisfactory, the court would then review
the arbitration custody award under the extremely deferential standard that it
would apply to any other arbitration award. 42 As Philbrick explains her
standard, however, the court would still have the
ability to set aside any award
43
that fails to protect the child's best interests.
Philbrick explains that an arbitrator's award can be set aside on the
grounds that the arbitrator exceeded her power. 4' A "child-centered" arbitration contract must direct the arbitrator to base her custody decision on the best
interests ofthe child.145 Philbrick concludes, therefore, that where the arbitrator has failed to issue a custody ruling based on the child's best interests, the
court may vacate the award.' 46 Philbrick argues that her standard is not
equivalent to de novo review, however, because the court need not take any
new evidence and "[o]nce the threshold question of the quality of the [arbitration] process - whether the arbitration clause on its face is sufficiently child
protective - is resolved, the party challenging the
award should bear a heavy
47
burden of proving that the decision is unfair.'
138. Philbrick, supra note 101, at 455; see also McGuane, supra note 101, at 402-17
(proposing model custody arbitration act that would require procedural safeguards, such as
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law by arbitrator, that would allow for appellate
review based solely on arbitration record and that would protect best interests of child without
trial de nevo); Albano, supra note 113, at 444 (proposing that custody arbitrator be required to
issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law along with her award that would help
reviewing court determine whether arbitrator correctly applied governing law).
139. Philbrick, supranote 101, at 455-59.
140. Id. at 457.
141. Id. at 459-60.
142. Id. at 460.
143. Id. at460-61.
144. Id.
145. Id. at461.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Similarly, several other commentators have recommended the use of a
presumption that the arbitrator's award promotes the child's best interests as
a means to achieve the proper balance between the interests that are promoted
by according finality to an arbitrator's custody award and the state's interest
in child welfare.' 4 Under such an approach, the court would retain the right,
indeed the responsibility, to review any arbitration custody award to ensure
that the award serves the best interests ofthe child. The court would begin its
review, however, with a presumption that the arbitrator's custody award is
appropriate. A challenger could overcome the presumption "only if the award
is clearly contrary to the best interests of the child."1 49 As one student commentator has explained this approach, although '"he court would still retain
the power to modify or reject the [arbitration award for custody] if it found
that the best interests of the child so required," 50 this type of review differs
from a strict de novo review:
Because of the highly subjective nature of the 'best interests" test and the
inherent lack ofcertainty that any given decision is better thanmany ofits
alternatives, ajudge could easily find that althoughthe committee's decision was not the one he would have made de novo, he cannot be certain
that his choice is more likely to serve the child's best interests than is the
committee's. Only where he can be certain of this is the committee's
decision contrary to public policy.' 5'
Finally, not all commentators have worked within a framework that
accepts the conventional wisdom (and dominant case law) that the state must
ensure that any child custody arbitration award comports with the state's view
of the child's best interests. For example, Professors Janet Spencer and
Joseph Zammit have argued that a court should enforce an arbitration custody
award in the same manner that the court would enforce a commercial arbitration award, provided that the custody award does not constitute or make
possible abuse or neglect of the child.' 52 Professors Spencer and Zammit
supra note 99, at 342; Note, supra note 101, at 1210 n.57; cf Citizens
148. Kessler et al.,
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415-17 (1971) (holding that even when
administrative agency's decision is "entitled to a presumption of regularity," federal court must
subject such decision to "a thorough, probing, in-depth review").
supra note 99, at 342.
149. Kessler et al.,
150. Note, supra note 101, at 1206-07.
151. Id.at1210 n.57. North Carolina and Texas have codified this type ofreview for child
custody arbitrations by placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to vacate an arbitration
award to demonstrate that the award is contrary to the best interests of the child. See N.C. GEN'.
STAT. §§ 50-41,42,54 (1999); TOx. FAM. CoDEANN. § 153.0071(b) (Vernon 1996 & Supp.
2000).
152. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 36, at 936-37; see also Schlissel, supra note 100, at
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expressly state that their argument is premised not on the notion that parents

are best able to make decisions concerning their child, but rather on the
principle that parental autonomy includes the "freedom to decide wrongly "iss
and that fracture
of the family should not be cause for the state to infringe this
4

freedon-

5

Despite the breakdown in the marital relationship, the preservation of

family autonomy demands that parents retain the right to make decisions
affecting the upbringing oftheir childrenL To the extentthatparents, even
after a good faith effort; cannot agree between themselves on what is best
fortheir children, they should at least havethe rightto choosethe decisionmaker and should not be compelled to accept an individual or committee
chosen by the state whose values may significantly differ from their own.
The only limitation on this parental right should be that imposed upon all
parents, namely, that their conduct not constitute neglect. 155
Given that Professors Spencer and Zammitt ground their approach to
judicial review of custody arbitration awards on the principle of preservation
of family autonomy, one might expect that their argument would focus on the
nature and sources offamily autonomy and on the principles and policies that
support state deference to the family generally, and are used to justify state
intervention in the family only in certain limited circumstances. Professors
Spencer and Zammitt, however, fail to offer this analysis.1s 6 Rather, they
justify their approach by reference to arbitration's principal merits (which
83 (arguing that heightened review of arbitration custody award is inconsistent with Uniform
Arbitration Act).
153.
154.

Spencer & Zammi supranote 36, at 913.
Id.
Id. at 918-19; see alsoN.ML STAT.ANqN. § 40-4-7.2(A)& (T) (Michie 1999) (discuss-

155.
ig when court may vacate arbitration award). The statute states:
The court may vacate an award of custody, time-sharing or visitation made in
binding arbitration if the court finds that circumstances have changed since issuance
of the award that are adverse to the best interests of the child, [or] upon a finding
that the award will cause harm or be detrimental to a child.
Id

156. Professors Spencer and Zammit's discussion of family autonomy is largely limited
to a single paragraph, in which they assert thatjudges are not inherently more qualified to make
decisions concerning a child's custody. They argue that because the parents gave birth to the
child, have the primary responsibility for the child's financial and emotional needs, and have
superior knowledge of those needs and of the child's desires, and out of respect for diversity,
the judgment of the parents concerning their child's interests ought to be presumed acceptable.
Spencer & Zammit, supra note 36, at 918; see also id. at 937-38 (offering in support of their
standard of limited judicial review of arbitration custody awards notion that "state paternalism
is inconsistent with our historical and constitutional traditions," but failing to elaborate on this

point).
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they list as respect for parent-centered decisionmaking and the allowance of
private and quick resolution of the family dispute) and the extent to which de
novo review of a custody arbitration award would undermine these merits. 7
Professors Spencer and Zammit provide a thoughtful discussion of the merits
of alternative dispute resolution in resolving family disputes, but they fail to
expound an argument for state deference to a custody arbitral process beyond
the utility of the process itself.
Indeed, notably absent from all of the case law and the academic commentary on the appropriate level of judicial review to be given arbitration
custody and visitation awards is any serious discussion of the principles and
policies that generally are thought to support state deference to family autonomy as the default approach to family regulation or of the principles and
policies that generally are thought to justify state intervention in the family
under certain circumstances. The remainder of this Article examines these
principles and policies and explores their relationship to the question of the
appropriate level ofjudicial review for a parent-sponsored arbitration award
for child custody.
IV PoliciesThat Guide State Deference to and
Interventionin the Family
In considering whether courts should enforce arbitration agreements and
awards that purport to govern custody and visitation rights relating to a minor
child, a good place to start is a consideration of why the state generally
intervenes or refrains from intervening in the parent-child relationship. The
state's principal goal in regulating the parent-child relationship is to promote
the likelihood that the child will develop into a physically and 58
emotionally
healthy adult capable of contributing to the well-being of society.
One approach that the state might take in furtherance of this goal is to
prescribe in great detail what it views as the optimal parental behavior. Under
such an approach, the state would need to set out and enforce punishments for
parents who fail to conform to the optimal behavior. Thus, the state could
regulate the child's sleeping schedule, her diet, her play-time activities and
companions, the content of her education, her television viewing habits, and
so on.
157. Id. at 918-19, 929-38; see also id. at 937 ("Uless the courts are willing to refrain
from interfering in the model of dispute resolution proposed in this Article, the value of that
model may be largely negated; parents will know that if they 'lose' in arbitration they can still

resort to the courts.").
158. See Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2415, 2417, 2431 (discussing societal goals at
stake in regulation of parent-child relationship).
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The state has not seen fit, however, to require that parents conform to its
view of optimal parental behavior. Rather, the general approach of the state
is to allow parents in an intact family the freedom to raise their children as the
parents see best, subject only to proscriptions against parenting that the state
sees as abusive, neglectfil, or seriously threatening the welfare ofthe child.'59
The state intervenes more readily in the parent-child relationship when the
family is fractured, such as with the divorce of a father and mother, than when
the family is intact. 60 Still, such state intervention falls far short of a general
prescription of optimal behavior.
The state's great reluctance to interfere with the parent-child relationship,
especially in the intact family, is grounded on two bases.' 6' First, our society
has developed a respect for the parental "right" against the state to raise one's
child as one thinks best. In this view, extensive state intervention is inconsistent with the social and constitutional norm favoring family autonomy. 162 Pursuant to this view, state intervention is not appropriate even if it could be
shown that state intervention would optimize outcomes.
A second basis for state deference to the intact family is the belief that
extensive state intervention generally would not be effective at optimizing outcomes. Several prudential considerations, discussed below, inform this judg-

ment that the state is likely to fail to optimize outcomes by widely replacing
parental judgment with state judgment in matters concerning the welfare of
a child. 63 Other prudential considerations, also discussed below, support
159.

See Fineman, supra note 129, at 1215 ("Parental conduct, be it discipline or decision-

making, is generally protected unless it constitutes abuse or neglect of the child."); Scott, supra
note 34, at 669 ("Except for defining the outer limits of acceptable behavior (definitions that
also track social norms), the law seldom attempts to regulate relationships, dictate functions,
enforce obligations, or resolve conflicts within the intact family.").
160. See Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MIa. J.L.
REFORM 835, 841 (1985) ("Divorce or legal separation may also be considered a sufficient
trigger to justify state intervention that would otherwise not be allowed."); Scott, supra note 34,
at 669-70 (pointing to visitation and child support court orders as examples of how "[t]he
curtain of family privacy is lifted upon divorce").
161. See Teitelbaum,supranote 64, at 1145.46 (commenting that notion offamily privacy
includes two situations - those situations in which state declines to intervene in family disputes
for prudential reasons, and those situations in which state may not intervene because family
matter at hand is outside scope of permissible government regulation).
162. See Fineman, supra note 129, at 1207 ("For the modem private family, protection
from public interference remains the publicly stated norm - state intervention continues to be
cast as exceptional, requiring somejustification.").
163. See id. at 1214 ("This ideology of state non-intervention is rooted in idealization, but
also references the perceived pragmatics of family relationships and the acknowledged limitations of legal, particularly judicial, systems as substitutes for family decision-making.").
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greater state intervention in the family, however, when the family has become
fractured.
This Article next discusses, in trm,both the constitutional and prudential
bases for non-intervention in the parent-child relationship, as well as the
prudential considerations that have been advanced to justify somewhat greater
state intervention in the fractured family. Further, the Article considers how
these bases governing state deference to and intervention in the family relate

to the arbitrability of custody disputes.
A. The ConstitutionalNorm RespectingParentalAutonomy and
Its Application to the Arbitrabilityof Custody Disputes
1. ConstitutionalDeference to the Parent-ChildRelationship
A principal reason given for state deference to the intact family is our
nation's purported respect for freedom of choice in family matters generally" 6
and, more specifically, respect for the privacy right of parents to raise their
children as they see fit.165 The notion of parental autonomy has come to be
t and a constitutional right. 67
seen as both an important social non&'

164. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (stating that judicial
deference to legislature is not appropriate when state undertakes intrusive regulation of family
as freedom of choice in family matters is fundamental liberty interest protected by Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause); Mnookin, supra note 19, at 266 (remarking that family
autonomy has been "the traditional American assumption" and state paternalism is "inconsistent
with our historical and constitutional traditions").
165. See James 0. Dwyer, Children's Interests in a Family Context-A Cautionary Note,
39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1059 (1999) (stating that parental right to privacy is wellrecognized). Specifically, Dywer states that
[it is fair to say that the belief that parents have a presumptive entitlement to be left
alone, which is forfeited only when their conduct is truly egregious or their judgment in child-rearing is way outside the bounds of reasonableness (itself a very
permissive (and amorphous) standard), generally has a strong hold on the judiciary,
just as it does on the public.
Id.
166. See Scott, supra note 34, at 669 ("The idea of a court directing parents to reallocate
their child care and occupational responsibilities in an intact family has an Orwellian flavor that
would be highly offensiveto mostpeople...
167. See Fineman,supranote 129, at 1212 (notingthat idea offamilyas "private" "predates,
and is analytically separate from, the constitutional idea of individual privacy"); see also In re
J.P., 648 P2d 1364,1373 (Utah 1982) ("This parental right ...is rooted not in state or federal
statutory or constitutional law, to which it is logically and chronologically prior, but in nature
and human instinct"). For an argument that anti-slavery and Reconstruction history and the
human rights traditions that drove the anti-slavery and Reconstruction movements lend strong
supportto a constitutional right ofparental autonomy, see DAVIS, supra note 5, at 108-07.
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The Supreme Court first elaborated on the constittional right respecting
parental autonomy in a pair of 1920s cases implicating the right of parents to
6 9 the Court
control the education of their children.a In Meyer v. Nebraska,"
struck down a Nebraska statute that crhninalized the teaching of any modem
language other than English to any pupil who had not yet passed the eighth
grade." ° In overturning the conviction of a teacher who had taught German
to a child not yet a graduate of the eighth grade, the Court considered the
purpose of the legislation: "[T]o promote civic development by inhibiting
training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before
they could learn English and acquire American ideals.""' The Court expressed its understanding of "[tlhe desire of the legislature to foster a homogenous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current
discussions of civic matters.""7 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
state's means to achieve this goal violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, the protections of which included the teacher's "right thus to
teach [German] and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their

children."

173

Two years after it decided Meyer, the Supreme Court again spoke on
parental autonomy. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,14 the Court struck down

an Oregon statute that required every parent to send her child between the
168.

Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390

(1923).
169. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
170. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,396-97,402 (1923).
171. Id. at401; see also Teitelbaum, supra note 64, at 1151-52 (describing how, by middle
1800s, public education was being used as vehicle for promoting good citizenship and instilling
American ideals in children who might not be exposed to preferred values at home); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns The Child?'" Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property,
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1007-12 (1992) (describing how Americans, in half century
before Supreme Court decided Meyer, had come to view common schools and English only
laws as means ofaeculturating immigrant and poor children).
172. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
173. Id. at400,403. The Court also noted the Spartan practice ofremoving children at age
seven to barracks where the state set out to "submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens." Id at 402. The Court remarked that.
[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius,
their ideas touching the relation between individual and state were wholly different
from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any
Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing
violence to both letter and spirit ofthe Constitution.
Id. at 402.
174. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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ages of eight and sixteen to a public school.1 The Court held that "[u]nder
the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska ... we think it entirely plain that the [act
at issue] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.'1 76 The
Court spoke more generally on the relation between parent, child and state:
The fundamental theory of hlety upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature ofthe State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.' 7
It is clear after Meyer and Pierce that the federal due process clauses
limit state and federal power to intrude on parental decisionmaking authority
respecting the welfare of a child. 7 ' The Constitution requires a considered
balancing between parental autonomy interests and the state's parenspatriae
duties. Although parental autonomy is a principal value, the state remains free
to act to ensure '"hat children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for
growth into free and independent well-developed [persons]
79
and citizens.'
In Prince v. Massachusetts,' the Court struck this balance in favor of
state intervention."' In Prince,the Court was confronted with a claim that
certain of Massachusetts's child labor laws violated Ms. Prince's right to free
exercise of her religion as well as her right to parental autonomy." 2 Ms.
Prince had been convicted of furnishing a minor child for whom she served
as guardian with magazines with the knowledge that the child would unlawfully sell those magazines on the street." In her defense, Ms. Prince claimed
that she had the right to instruct the child in the tenets of their faith,
which
18 4
tenets included the public distnbution of certain religious literature.
175.

Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,530-31,536 (1925).

176.
177.

Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.

178.

See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 267 (concluding that Pierce "may be viewed as a

constitutionally-based limitation on state power to intrude into family decision-making" and that
"[t]he high value placed upon family autonomy reflected in that decision suggests a consensus

that government may act coercively only when good cause is shown").
179. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,165 (1944).
180.

321 U.S. 158 (1944).

181.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,170 (1944).

182.

Id. at 159,164.

183.
184.

Id. at 159-61.
Id. at 164.
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that the liberties claimed by Ms.
Prince were "sacred" and "basic in a democracy." ' But, the Court also observed that in "[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the
state asparenspatriaemay restrict the parent's control."186 The Court further
remarked: "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all
that implies. Itmay secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within
a broad range of selection."'" The Court provided examples of appropriate
state intervention in the parent-child relationship, including regulations
requiring school attendance, compelling vaccinations, and prohibiting child
labor. 8 8 The Court concluded, therefore, that the state's parens patriae
powers included the right to proscribe street preaching by a child, even against
a claim of parental autonomy or religious freedom.189
The Court itselt in the later case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,"9 extracted from
Princethe principle that the state is free to infringe parental autonomy whenever "harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety,
peace, order or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred."19'
In Yoder, the Court addressed a challenge to a statute that required a parent to
send her child to public or private school until the child reached the age of
sixteen." The parents in Yoder refused to send their children, ages fourteen
and fifteen, to school after the children had completed the eighth grade.1"
When charged with violating the compulsory school attendance statute, the
parents asserted their belief that their children's attendance at high school
would be contrary to the Amish religion and would endanger their own salvation and the salvation of their children.' 94 Thus, the parents argued that the
compulsory school-attendance law violated their right and the right of their
children to free exercise of their religion. 95
185. Id.at 165; see also id. at 166 ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
186. Id.at 166.
187. Id.at 168.
188. Id.at 166.
189. Id.at 168-70.
190. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
191. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,229-30 (1972) (distinguishing instant case from
Prince on ground that Prince, unlike instant case, presented case of likely harm to child), see
also id. at 233-34 (stating that, under Prince, state may infringe parental autonomy "ifit appears
that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child").
192. Id. at207.
193. Id.
194. Id.at209.
195.

Id. at 215.
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In overturning the parents' convictions for violation of the compulsory
school-attendance statute, the Court first stated that under Prince, 'the power
of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to
limitation... if it appears that parental decisions willjeopardize the health or
safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.' 96 The
Court concluded, however, that the record did not demonstrate that accommodating the religious objections of the Amish by waiving for Amish children two
additional years of compulsory education would so harm a child or society.' 7
It is important to note that Yoder did not involve a claim of parental
autonomy apart from the free exercise claim.'" Therefore, although Yoder's
discussion of Prince is helpful in suggesting the outer limits of parental
autonomy - specifically that the state may actto prevent "harmto the physical
or mental health of the child or to the public ...welfare"' - the decision is
less helpful in calibrating the outer limits of state authority to infringe parental
authority in the absence of a free exercise claim.
Recently, in Troxel v. Granville,'o the Supreme Court gave more definition to the outer limits of state authority to interfere in the parent-child relationship. Troxel involved the question of when the state permissibly may
grant a grandparent visitation rights with her grandchild over the objections
of the grandchild's custodial parent. The Washington non-parental visitation
statute at issue had been drafted broadly to allow "any person" to petition for
visitation rights with respect to a child "at any time" and to allow a court to
grant such visitation rights provided only that the court first find that such
"visitation may serve the best interest of the child."201
The Supreme Court held that the Washington non-parental visitation
statute, as applied to the facts of the Troxel case, unconstitutionally infringed
upon a parent's fimdamental right to make decisions concerning the care and
custody of her child. Although six Justices authored separate opinions in the
Troxel case, andno opinion gameredmorethan four votes, the plurality andtwo
concurring opinions read together do suggest outer limits on the state's authority to override a parent's decisions concerning the best interests of her child.
In Troxel, the superior court had granted visitation rights to the paternal
grandparents of the two children of the grandparents' late son and a mother
who wished to allow the grandparents less extensive visitation than the grand196. Id. at233-34.
197. Id. at 234.
198. See id. at 215 (suggesting that secular claim, if asserted separate from free exercise
claim, would not prove successful in challenging "reasonable state regulation of education").
199. Id. at230.
200. 120 S. Ct 2054 (2000).
201. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2057 (2000) (O'Connor, I., plurality opinion)
(quoting WASIL REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)).
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parents desired. 2" The case did not involve any allegation that the mother was
unfit. 20 3 Nevertheless, the superior court granted visitation rights to the
such visitation rights would serve the best
grandparents because it found that
2°4
interests of the children involved.
Upon the mother's appeal of the superior court's order granting the
grandparents visitation rights, the Washington Supreme Court held that the
non-parental visitation statute unconstitutionally infringed upon a parent's
right to rear her children.20 5 The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause permits the state to interfere with a parent's right to rear
her child only to prevent a present or threatened harm to the child. 2' The
court further reasoned that, as the Washington statute authorized the state to
grant visitation rights whenever a court found that such visitation would serve
the best interests of the child, but did not require any showing of present or
threatened harm absent such visitation, the statute ran afoul of the federal
Constitution. 20 7 In sum, the Washington Supreme Court held that "[i]t is not
the
within the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning
208
custody of children merely because it could make a 'better' decision.1
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ofthe Washington Supreme Court.20 9 The plurality opinion, however, declined to decide
whether the Washington Supreme Court was correct in holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires a showing of present
or threatened harm before the state may grant non-parental visitation rights
over the objection of a parent.210
202. Id. at 2057-58.
203. See id. at 2061 (noting that "there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their children").
204. Id. at 2058.
205. SeeIn re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21,30-31 (Wash. 1998) (reviewing consolidated
appeal of Troxel case).
206. Id. at 28-29.
207. Id. at 30.
208. Id. at 31.
209. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2064 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,plurality
opinion).
210. Id. at 2064. Several state supreme courts have reached this issue. Some have held
that under the federal Due Process Clause a state may grant grandparent visitation rights over
the objection of a fit parent only if the denial of such rights would jeopardize the health or safety
ofthe child. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Ga. 1995) (holding that statute
granting grandparents right to visitation award if court found such visitation to be in best
interests of child violates both Georgia and federal Constitutions in "fail[ing] to require a
showing of harm before visitation can be ordered"); In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 29-30
Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct 2054
(Wash. 1998) (en bane), affd on other grounds sub noma.
(2000) (holding that Supreme Court cases which support constitutional right to rear one's child
and right to family privacy indicate that state may interfere only "if it appears that parental
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Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, authored an opinion
grounded on the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause "protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.1211 In sum, the plurality
concluded that the Washington statute, as applied inthe Troxel case, ran afoul
of this fundamental right. The superior court had erred because it had failed
to give any special deference to a parent's view as to whether certain visitation arrangements would be in the child's best interests.212

The plurality noted that,
so long as aparentadequatelycares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there
will normallybe no reasonfor the Stateto inject itself into the private realm
of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children."'
The plurality further asserted that a state's custody and visitation framework
must respect, to some undefined degree, the presumption that a parent will act
in her child's best interests: "[I]fa fit parent's decision ofthe kind at issue here
becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special
weight to the parent's own determination."214 Finally, applying this principle
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant
social burdens" and, therefore, "[sitate intervention to better a child's quality of life through
third party visitation is not justified where the child's circumstances are otherwise satisfactory");
see also Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E2d 417,417-18 (Va 1998) (affirming court of appeals'
holding that Virginia's non-parental visitation statute did not violate Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause because statute first requires finding of "actual harm to the child's health
or welfare without such visitation"); Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation. Can the Parent
Refuse?, 24 J.FAM. L. 393,441 (1985-86) ("Intervention based solely on a best interest of the
child standard, with no showing of harm, is an unconstitutional inflingement upon and deprivation of the right of parents to raise their child in accord with their own values."); Gregory, supra
note 29, at 402 (arguing on both constitutional and prudential grounds that courts should not
overrule parent's decision concerning third-party visitation with her child absent showing of
"demonstrable harm or danger to the child"). Other state supreme courts, however, have upheld
grandparent visitation statutes that allow an award of visitation if in the best interests of the
child, against challenges based on the federal Due Process Clause's protection of parent
autonomy. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632-33 (Ky. 1992) (upholding constitutionality
of grandparent visitation statute that allows court to order visitation if it finds that such visitation would be in best interest of child); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Mo. 1993)
(en banc) (upholding constitutionality of grandparent visitation statute that allows court to order
visitation if it finds that grandparent has been unreasonably denied visitation for period
exceeding ninety days and such visitation would be in best interests of child).
211. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also id. at 2076
(Kennedy, I., dissenting) (noting that separate opinions in Troxel generally agreed that "the
custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the state,
how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child").
212. Id.at 2061-62 (O'Connor, I., plurality opinion).
213. Id. at 2061.
214. Id. at 2062. The plurality continued:
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to the facts at hand, the plurality concluded that the Washington non-parental
visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied. 5 In this case, the superior
court failed to give special weight to the mother's decision on the visitation
matter.2 6 Instead, the court based its visitation award on only its findings that
27

the children would benefit from visitation with their paternal grandparents.

1

Justices Thomas and Souter authored separate opinions concurring in the
judgment in Troxel. Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that the Court's
prior cases had held that parents have "a fundamental constitutional right to
rear their children, including the right to determine who shall educate and
socialize them." ' Given this fundamental right, Justice Thomas argued that
the Court should apply strict scrutiny to any infringement of the right.1 9
Finally, Justice Thomas concluded that '"he State of Washington lacks even a
legitimate government interest - to say nothing of a compelling one - in second
0
guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties."2

Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the Washington
Supreme Court's holding that the non-parental visitation statute was invalid
on its ftce because the statute allowed a court to grant visitation rights to any
person at any time subject only to a best interests standard.2 For Justice
Souter, the problem was not that the superior court improperly exercised its
discretion in awarding visitation rights to the grandparents, but rather that the
statute gave the superior court judge too much discretion.' Justice Souter
reasoned that "Meyer'srepeatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a
sham if it failed to encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled
visitation by 'any party' at 'any time' a judge believed he 'could make a
"better" decision' than the objecting parent had done."'
The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contravened the
traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her
child. In that respect, the court's presumption [in favor of grandparent visitation]
failed to provide any protection for [the mother's] fundamental constitutional right
to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters.

Id.
215. Id. at 2063.
216. Id. at 2063-64.
217. Id. at 2063.
218. Id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring opinion). Justice Thomas noted that neither party
to the litigation had argued that the court's substantive due process cases had been wrongly
decided, and so, he left "resolution of that issue for another day." Id. at 2067.
219. Id.at 2068.
220. Id.
221.

Id. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring opinion).

222. See id at 2066-67 & n3 (explaining that "if every application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited discretion, then the ordinance is invalid in all its applications"
(quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,71 (1999))).
223. Id. at 2066-67.
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Thus, although the plurality and concurring opinions in Troxel failed to
precisely define the scope ofthe parental due process right to decide visitation
issues, the three opinions do suggest that a state court violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause when it disregards a fit parent's decision
as to the custody or visitation arrangements regarding her child merely because the court disagrees with the parent as to what is best for the child.
Moreover, given Justice Thomas's call for a compelling state interest before
a court may properly disregard a fit parent's decisions regarding visitation by
third parties, it seems reasonable to conclude that a majority of the Court's
justices adhere to the Troxel plurality's lesser requirement that a court give
"special weight" to a parent's custody or visitation decision. 4
2. Application of the ConstitutionalNorm Respecting ParentalAutonomy
to the Arbitrabilityof Custody Disputes
Given that the federal Constitution's due process clauses require that a
court give "special weight" to a parent's custody and visitation decisions, the
presently dominant approaches to judicial enforcement of custody arbitration
agreements and awards are likely unconstitutional. The dominant approaches
reason that an agreement to arbitrate custody "is indistinguishable from an
agreement to give custody."' If one accepts that a child's parents' agreement
to arbitrate their dispute with respect to her custody is itself a species of
parental decisionmaking with respect to her custody, it follows that, under
224. The constitutions of certain states might provide greater protection against state
intervention in the parent-child relationship than the federal constitution provides under the
Troxel decision. See Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514-16 (Ha. 1998) (striking down child
visitation award to grandparents as offensive to guarantee of privacy in Florida constitution and
holding that because of privacy rights guaranteed to parents by Florida constitution, "[n]either
the legislature nor the courts may properly intervene in parental decision-making absent
significant harm to the child threatened by or resulting from those decisions"); Brooks v.
Parkerson, 454 S.E2d 769, 773-74 (Ga. 1995) (holding that statute granting grandparents right
to visitation award if court deems such visitation to be in best interests of child violates Georgia
constitution in "fail[ing] to require a showing of harm before visitation can be ordered"); Hawk
v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577-79 (Tenn. 1993) (concluding that statute allowing court to award
grandparents visitation when it was merely in best interests of child violated Tennessee constitution's right to privacy as applied to "married couple, whose fitness as parents is unchallenged");
see also Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D. 1999) (holding that, pursuant to federal
and North Dakota constitutions, "only compelling circumstances should justify governmental
intervention to override parental choices for their children's associations beyond the immediate
household" and finding that state had not demonstrated "compelling interest in presuming
visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor are in the child's best interests and
forcing parents to accede to court-ordered grandparental visitation unless the parents are first
able to prove such visitation is not in the best interests oftheir minor child").
225. See Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 1993) (setting out this
point in void approach jurisdiction); Sheets v. Sheets, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320,323 (App. Div. 1964)
(setting out this point in voidable approach jurisdiction).

1190

57 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1139 (2000)

Troxel, a court should give "special weight" to an arbitrator's custody decision, and should not replace the arbitrator's judgment with its own "simply
6
because [the] judge believes a 'better' decision could be made."22 Nevertheless, neither the courts that follow the void approach to the enforcement of
custody arbitration agreements and awards, nor those courts that follow the
voidable approach to the enforcement of such agreements and awards, give the
constitutionally mandated "special weight" to the decisions of parents who
have chosen custody arbitration to resolve their custody dispute or to the
custody decisions of the parents' chosen arbitrator.
Under the void approach, the parents' wishes concerning the resolution
oftheir custody dispute through arbitration are wholly irrelevant. A court that
employs the void approach will not give any weight under any circumstances
to any custody arbitration agreement or award. Rather, the court will act as
though no such agreement or award ever existed.
Thus, one could not design an approach to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements for custody more intrusive on a parent's right to make important
decisions concerning the welfare of her child. The void approach seems
irreconcilably in conflict with Troxel's mandate that a court give special
weight to a parent's decisions with respect to the custody and visitation ofher
child. Therefore, if Troxel has any force whatsoever inthe context of custody
arbitration agreements, the void approach to enforcement of custody arbitration agreements and awards is an unconstitutional infringement ofthe parents'
due process right of parental autonomy.
Under the voidable approach, a court will enforce an arbitration agreement or award provided that the agreement or award is in the best interests of
the child.r 7 One might argue that there is little real difference between the
void approach, in which the court disregards any custody arbitration award
and proceeds to enter a custody award based on its own determination of what
is in the best interests of the child, and the voidable approach, in which the
court will enforce the arbitrator's custody award only ifthat award comports
with the court's own determination of what is in the best interests ofthe child.
In some circumstances, however, important practical differences arise from
the applications of the two different approaches.
Under the voidable approach, parents enjoy the freedom to design a custody dispute resolution proceeding that ultimately might produce an enforce226. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2062,2063-64 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
This Article's arguments, set forth below with respect to the enforceability under Troxel of
custody arbitration agreements and awards, also apply with full force to the enforceabilty of

separation agreements for custody. The present dominant approach to judicial enforcement of
such a separation custody agreement, under which a court will enforce the agreement only if it
finds that the agreement comports with the court's view of the child's best interests, is unconstitutional. See supra note 214 and accompanying text
227. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (discussing voidable approach).
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able custody and visitation arrangement that could not have been arrived at as
an initial matter in the public court system. For example, as discussed supra,
in the case of lesbian co-parents, the co-parents might design a dispute resolution proceeding that alters the dominant rules for standing and substantive
custody decisionmaking so that the co-parent who is not a legal parent of her
child is not disadvantaged relative to the legal parent. This dispute resolution
proceeding ultimately might produce an award of custody to the co-parent
who is not the legal parent of the child.
If,
upon review in the public court applying the voidable approach, the
court determines that the custody award to the "non-parent" is in the best
interests of the child, the court should enforce the award of custody to the coparent who is not a legal parent. Had the custody determination been made
as an initial matter in a public court, however, under the law ofmanyjurisdictions, the co-parent who is not a legal parent to the child would not have had
standing to compete for custody. Similarly, in a jurisdiction that applies a
void approach to custody arbitration awards, the co-parent who is not a legal
parent might not have had an opportunity to assert her claim for custody.
Thus, in a jurisdiction with a voidable approach, custody arbitration provides
parents with a greater degree of autonomy to resolve their custody dispute as
they see fit as compared with custody litigation in a public court or custody
arbitration in a jurisdiction with a void approach.
Nevertheless, even the voidable approachto judicial review of arbitration
awards falls short ofthe constitutional standard set forth in Troxel. Any review
of a parent-sponsored arbitration award for custody to ensure that the award
comports with the court's view of the best interests of the child intrudes upon
parental autonomy.' The intrusiveness results from the nature of the "best
interests of the child" standard, which places a great deal of discretion in the
hands of the decisionmaker.
228. See Bean, supra note 210, at 441 ("For the state to delegate to the parents the
authority to raise the child as the parents see fit, except when the state thinks another choice
would be better, is to give the parents no authority at all."); Scott, supra note 34, at 616 (noting
that under best interests of child standard, "anything a judge finds important to the child's
welfare may decide custody, from parental religious practices to lifestyle preferences").
229. Commentators have long attacked the best interests standard for the broad discretion

it places in the hands of the decisionmaker. See Chambers, supra note 64, at 487-89 (arguing
that best interests of child standard is both too broad, because of lack of guidance it provides
to judges as to how to decide what is best for child, and too narrow in failing to consider interests of parents in certain circumstances); Andrea Charlow,Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 267, 269-73, 281-83 (1987)
(attacking broad grant of discretion in best interests standard and suggesting alternate custody

standard favoring parent who is best able to place child's interest above her own in order to
avoid conflict); Gregory, supra note 29, at 387 (concluding that best interests test "provides to
judges the invitation, which they frequently accept with alacrity, to engage in virtually untram-

meled exercises of discretion in deciding issues of child custody and visitation"); Mnookin,
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In deciding which outcome is in the best interests of a child, the court

must assign values to the competing outcomes. In doing so under the best
interests of the child standard, the court is able to substitute its values, or
those of the state, for those of the family.Y As the Supreme Court of Florida

has stated:
[1]here is an inherentproblemwithutilizing abest interest analysis as the
basis for government interference in the private lives of a family, rather
than requiring a showing ofdemonstrated harmto the child. Itpermits the
State to substitute its ownviews regarding how a child shouldbe raised for
those of the parent It involves the judiciary in second-guessing parental
decisions. It allows a courtto impose "its own notion of the children's best
interests over the shared opinion ofthese parents, stripping them of their
right to control in parenting decisions.12
For example, two individuals might differently value an outcome that
produces a child who is an independent thinker. Therefore, two decisionmakers applying the best interests standard might evaluate differently the
merits of a parent whom the decisionmakers believe will encourage independent thinking in a child." z In this way, the decisionmaker's private beliefs and
supra note 19, at 227 (noting in 1975 that "[i]n the last decade... some commentators have

attacked the breadth of discretion granted judges in resolving custody disputes"). For a
summary of the leading academic criticisms of the best interests of the child standard, see Carl
E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA 's Best-Interest

Standard,89 MitcE. L. REv. 2215,2219-25 (1991) (reviewing critiques of several prominent
academics and concluding that "there is a weighty body of opinion... that argues in various
ways and for various reasons that the best-interest standard confides too much to the discretion
ofjudges and that rules of some description should supplement or supplant it").
230. See Teitelbaum, supra note 64, at 1156 (discussing conduct and circumstances
relevant to best interest of child standard). Teitelbaum stated:
To make custody turn on the 'best interests' of the child means that a court must
decide what conduct and circumstances are desirable and what are not The criteria
for this decision, if not supplied by the parents themselves, must derive from the
judge's views of good child rearing and good citizenship.
Id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 5, at 244 ("It sometimes happens... that a state's intervention
[in the family] seems motivated by concern as much for the child's life-defining moral or value
choices as for the child's physical or emotional well-being."); Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D.
Polikoff, Custody RightsofLesbianMothers: Legal Theory andLitigation Strategy,25 BUFF.

L. REV. 691, 693-715 (1976) (discussing custody cases that involve lesbian mother and that
illustrate culturally biased nature of best interests of child standard).
231. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 516 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Beagle v. Beagle, 678
So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993))).

232. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 251 (noting that application of best interests standard
requires that custody decisionmaker evaluate competing claimants as "social being[s]" by
examining their "attitudes, dispositions, capacities, and shortcomings"). The subjectivity of this
initial valuing of a claimant's attributes produces uncertainty in predicting child placements.
The forward-looking nature of child custody determinations compounds this uncertainty. Id.
at 229-30,261. Although most adjudications center on the occurrence or meaning of completed
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mores concerning3 a wide range of factors might affect the custody decision-

making process.2

Moreover, the best interests standard of judicial review for parental
decisionmaking would be intrusive of family autonomy even if there were
some way to ensure that judges did not inject their private mores or biases into
their custody decisionmaking." 4 Were ajudge's discretion in making a "best
interests" determination to be effectively cabined by legislative or comnon
law guidelines, those guidelines themselves surely would reflect a societal
consensus as to the attributes or conditions that are likely to serve the best
acts, custody determinations require additional predictions concerning the effects that alternate
environments will produce in the child. Id. at 251. Thus, even if all rational persons could
agree that independent thinking is an evil that should be discouraged, one might still lack the
ability to predict which custody and visitation arrangements would best extinguish such
tendencies. See id. at 261 ("An inquiry about what is best for a child often yields indeterminate
results because of the problems of having adequate information, making the necessary predictions, and finding an integrated set of values by which to choose.").
233. SeeMaryBeckerMaternalFeelingsMyth, Taboo, and ChildCustody,I S.CAL.REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 133, 183 (1992) (asserting that "[b]ecause the best interest standard is so
open ended, a judge may reach virtually any result in a case as long as he does not base his
decision explicitly on impermissible criteria" and noting that judges tend to apply best interests
standard in ways that are biased in favor of remarried fathers and biased against working women,
poor women, lesbians, sexually active women who are not married to their partners, and women
in interracial marriages); Mnookin, supra note 19, at 269 ("An examination of available cases
dramatically illustrates how a judge's attitude toward child rearing, sexual mores, religion, or
cleanliness can affect the result of court proceedings."); Scott, supranote 34, at 622 (commenting
that best interests "determination can be speculative and value-laden, as the standard encourages
courts to assess the character of the contestants and the potential capacity of each to assume the
child's future care"); Id. at 638 (noting that wide-ranging inquiry of best interests standard affords
opportunity for judge's personal values and biases to influence decision); see also Carle v. Carle,
503 P.2d 1050,1054-55 (Alaska 1972) (finding, based on trial court's statements, that trial court
might have acted on its cultural bias against Native Alaskan way of life in awarding custody to
parent who lived in urban Juneau over parent who maintained rural Native lifestyle and remarking that "[w]e think it is not permissible, in a bicultural context, to decide a child's custody on the
hypothesis that it is necessary to facilitate the child's adjustment to what is believed to be the
dominant culture"); In re Petition of CMA and LAW., 715 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Il. App. Ct.
1999) (concluding that judge who was responsible for considering adoption petitions of two
lesbian couples "had a predetermined bias against lesbians" which influenced her actions in case);
In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 890 (Wash. 1983) (en bane) (Stafford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reporting comments oftrial judge who denied gay father home
visitation with his eight year-old son: "Well, in my view a child should be led in the way of
heterosexual preference, not be tolerant ofthis thing [homosexuality]").
234. One might reasonably fear that a court with such private value-laden reasons for a
child-placement decision might keep its reasons to itself but still rely upon them. See Mnookin,
supra note 19, at 270 (explaining that 'juvenile court judges can often disguise a decision based
on an 'improper' factor by vague recitation of general language: the real reasons may be very
different from the stated ones"); see also Charlow, supra note 229, at 272 (using the infamous
custody case of Painterv. Bannister,140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966) to illustrate how "subconscious values affect the process judges use to decide contested custody cases even if it is impossible to measure this influence precisely").
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interests of the child." 5 A parent's decision with respect to the upbringing of

her child is infringed as much when it is overturned as a result of societal
consensus as when it is overturned due to the private bias of a single judge.

In sum, when a court employs a voidable approach to overturn a parentsponsored arbitration award for custody merely because the court believes that
the arbitrator's decision does not serve the best interests ofthe child, the court
impermissibly infringes upon the parents' constitutional right to raise their
child as they see fit. Under the voidable approach, a custody arbitration award
may stand only if the award comports with the court's notion of what is best
for the child, that is, ifthe award comports with the values of the court or the
values of the state or both. Troxel teaches, however, that '"he Due Process
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents
to make child-rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a
'better' decision could be made."" 6 Moreover, it seems wholly inconsistent
with the Constitution's parental right of autonomy for a reviewing court to
235. See Chambers, supra note 64, at 481-82 (arguing that "to the extent that judges are
applying the wrong values [in applying the best interests standard], it is in part because legislatures have failed to convey a collective social judgment about the right values"); Martha
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 770 (1988) (arguing that standard that "avoids
moralizing in making choices between parents" yet will "have at its core an appreciation of what
we as a society agree will be in the 'best interests' of children" should replace best interests of
child standard); Schneider, supra note 229, at 2266-67 (suggesting that custody cases that
demonstrate bias against, for example, lesbian mothers or "religious fanaticism," may not reflect
judges substituting personal for public standards, but might actually reflect judges' consideration of community viewpoint); Note, Committee Decision of Child CustodyDisputes and the
Judicial Test of Best Interests,- 73 YALE L. 1201, 1202-03 (1964) (noting that best interests
standard "may demand a community consensus, expressed through the courts, as to the values
which the community desires to maximiz in child custody dispositions"); see also In re
Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E2d 281, 292 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that trial court may
properly consider mother's cohabitation with her lesbian partner as relevant factor affecting
child's best interests); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982) (noting testimony "that
it is in a child's best interests to be taught the prevailing morals of society, and that it is
generally considered immoral for two women to engage in a homosexual life-style" and holding
that trial court was justified in modifying custody from lesbian mother to father based on
mother's same-sex relationship); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981). The
Jacobsoncourt stated:
[W]e believe that because of the mores of today's society, because [the mother] is
engaged in a homosexual relationship in the home in which she resides with the
children, and because of the lack of legal recognition of the status of a homosexual
relationship, the best interests of the children will be better served by placing
custody of the children with [the father].
Id.
236. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct 2054,2064 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion);
see also Charlow, supra note 229, at 269 (concluding that best interests of child standard is "a
euphemism for unbridled judicial discretion").
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replace an arbitrator's custody award merely because the court believes the
award is likely to cause harm to the values or belief system of the child. 7
Rather, the Constitution requires that judicial review of a parent-sponsored arbitration award for custody, at a minimum, must give "special weight"
to the arbitrator's decision."' Absent some evidence that such a presumption
is not warranted in the instant case, the court's decisional framework must
respect the "presumption that a fit parent['s arbitrator] will act in the [child's]
best interest."' 9 As long as the arbitration award for custody is likelyto result
in the child receiving "adequate care" from her parents, the reviewing court
generally should allow the arbitration award to stand.2'
The constitutional analysis respecting the enforcement of custody arbitration awards becomes more complicated in situations involving a non-legal coparent. For example, alegalparentmay seekto avoid complying with a custody
arbitration agreement that she entered into with a non-legal co-parent, or she
may seek to have declared void a custody arbitration award resulting from such
an agreement with a non-legal co-parent. Thus, the legal parent may seek to
turn her constitutional shield from state interference with her parental autonomy into a sword wielded to defeatthe asserted parental rights ofher co-parent.
Recent litigation in Florida between lesbian co-parents illustrates the
above point. InKazmierazakv. Query,24 two former domestic partners fought
over custody ofthe child they had jointly raised since birth.142 The non-legal
mother alleged that the two co-parents executed an agreement shortly after
the child's birth giving the non-legal mother "an indefinite grant of custody."2' 43
The non-legal mother argued that she was entitled to a hearing to establish that
she was the "psychological parent" of the child.'
On the other side of the
237. See Shapiro, supra note 50, at 658 (endorsing strong view of parental rights). Shapiro
argues that
a parent's entitlement to teach the parent's own child right and wrong as the parent
sees fit lies at the core of the parental right to raise a child. The mere fact that a

parent raises a child to believe in a particular set of values cannot be the basis for
state interference with parental rights, unless it can further be shown that some real
harm - harm apart from the assertedly injurious belief system- will follow.
Id.

238.

Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2062 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id. at 2061.
736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1999).
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106,106 (la. Dist Ct App. 1999).
Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1999) (No. 98-02854). For the purposes of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim that was before the court, the court was obligated to treat this allegation as true. Reply
Brief of Appellant at 2 n2, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1999)
(No. 98-02854).
244. Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 106.
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dispute, the legal mother sought to deny her former lesbian partner custody or
visitation rights with respect to the child they had raised together; she argued
that the non-legal mother lacked standing to petition for such rights.245
The district court ofappeals affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor ofthe
legal mother on this ground.24 The district court of appeals went further,
however, and held that Florida's constitutional right of privacy precluded the
court from granting the non-legal mother visitation or custody rights over
the objection ofthe legal parent "absent a showing of demonstrable harm to the
child."247 Applying Von Effv. Azicri, 248 in which the Florida Supreme Court
struck down an award of child visitation to grandparents over the objection of
a natural parent as a violation of the Florida Constitution's guarantee of
privacy," the district court of appeal held that biological and adoptive parents
have a "fundamental and constitutional right ofprivacy... to make decisions
about their children's welfare without interference by third parties."" ° The
district court of appeal further held that "the state cannot intervene into a parent's fundamental or constitutionally protected right of privacy, either via the
judicial system or legislation, absent a showing of demonstrable harm to the
child." 12 5 The Kazmierazak court held, therefore, that it could not grant to a
"psychological parent" rights equivalent to those ofa biological parent."
The Kazmierazak court's holding, in the face of the lesbian couple's
agreement that the non-biological mother would have custody rights, suggests
that Florida's constitutional right to privacy may preclude a court from enforcing a pre-dissolution arbitration agreement purporting to govern custody disputes between a parent and a non-legal co-parent. The Kazmierazak holding,
however, disregards the legal parent's agreement and actions which sought to
enact a limited waiver of her parental right of autonomy. In a similar case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that "[t]hrough consent, a biological or
adoptive parent exercises his or her constitutional right of parental autonomy
to allow another adult to develop a parent-like relationship with the child." 3
It is no infringement of a citizen's constitutional right for the state merely to
245. Initial Prief ofAppellee at 4-6, Kazamierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Ma.Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (No. 98-02854).
246. Kazmierazak,736 So. 2d at 110.
247. Id. at 109.
248. 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1988).
249. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510,514-16 (Fla. 1988).
250. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106,109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. In re Custody ofH.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,436 nAO (Wis. 1995);see also id.at436
(holding that parent's constitutional right to rear her child as she sees fit is not infringed by award
of visitation to another person "when a parent consents to and fosters another person's establishing a parent-like relationship with a child and then substantially interferes with that relationship").
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enforce that citizen's knowing and volunteering contractual waiver of her
constitutional right.
Moreover, by failing to enforce the legal parent's agreement to arbitrate
custody disputes with her co-parent on terms that equalize the rights of the coparents, the court itself arguably infringes upon the biological mother's right
of privacy to make decisions about her child's welfare.' The Kazmierazak
rationale would preclude a lesbian mother from creating a family in which she
and her partner are jointly responsible for the development of their child and
share equally in the burdens and privileges that fulfilment of those obligations
ordinarily brings. It would be more in keeping with the spirit of the right to

parental autonomy to allow a legal parent to prospectively waive standing objections and the advantages that substantive custody standards give to legal
parents, so that the legal parent could create a family in which her co-parent
can invest fully in her relationship with their child secure in the knowledge
that her investment in the relationship could not be terminated at the will of
the legal parent." s
B. PrudentialConcerns Governing State Intervention in the Familyand
TheirApplication to the Arbitrabilityof Custody Disputes
Aside from the issue of the extent to which the state may infringe upon
a parent's right to raise her child as the parent sees fit, to what extent should
the state interfere with the parent-child relationship? Several prudential considerations militate against extensive state regulation of the family, and especially of the intact family. In most cases, extensive state regulation is not
necessary, will not be effective, and may be counterproductive by de-motivating parents who otherwise would attempt to act in their child's best interests. 6
When the relationship between a child's parents fractures, however, more
extensive state intervention in the parent-child relationship generally is thought
to be appropriate.
254. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as RelationalContract, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1225, 1232, 1246-47 (1998) (noting that "autonomous individuals frequently will
pursue their own ends by voluntarily restricting their future freedom through enforceable legal

commitments to others" and explaining how "[a] legal regime that constrains the freedom to
commit actually limits individual freedom").
255. See V.C. v. MJ3., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000), cert denied, 121 S.Ct. 302
(2000) (holding that legal parent waives to some extent zone of autonomous privacy for herself
and her child when she cedes to third party parental authority over the child, "the exercise of
which may create a profound bond with the child"); see also Olsen, supra note 160, at 842-44,
854 (arguing that state "non-intervention" in family is false ideal because state defines family
and, in that way, chooses whom to empower with respect to child).
256. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 267 ("The responsibility and opportunity of custody

is assigned to a child's natural parents, and for the overwhelming majority of children, this simple rule suffices.").
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1. State Deference to the IntactFamily
State deference to the intact family is grounded principally on the belief

that, in most cases, state intervention is not needed to ensure that parents
fulfill their roles in guiding the child to healthy adulthood. Even if the state
imposed no sanctions for inadequate parenting, most parents would seekto be
good parents to their children.' This result is thought to be the product of
natural parental affection
and social norms that reward good parenting and
58
sanction bad parenting:
The biological and affective bonds between parents and children together
with informal social norms encourage parents to identify their interests
with those of their children and to approach their performance as parents
with a sense of moral obligation. In such an environment parents would
expect to experience the rewards of social approval and self-fulfillment for
good parenting, and would expect both guilt and social opprobrium to
follow default.3
Parental autonomy is grounded also in the view that the state generally
functions poorly as a parent and, in most cases, would function less ably than
257. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The DarkSide ofFami Privacy, 67 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 1247, 1253, 1262 (1999) (conceding that "[a]s a general rule, what is good for mothers
is good for children and mothers are generally good ... to their children," but cautioning that
"[i]mproperly deployed, privacy as a principle of self government allows injustice within the
caretaker-dependent unit to fester, supported and subsidized by the larger society, without the
protection oflegal norms or external controls").
258. See Stephen G. Gilles, On EducatingChildren: A ParentalistManifesto,63 U. CHL
L. REV. 937, 953-55 (1996) (discussing evidence that "parents have powerful incentives to
pursue their own child's best interest"); Gilles, supra note 19, at 161 (describing society's
enforcement strategy). Gilles stated:
In light of the likelihood that intrusive state overight of family life would on balance reduce children's welfam, our society's enforcement strategy relies primarily
on parent's love for their children, on the child's voice within the family, and on
persuasion by public and expert opinion,.. . and only secondarily on courts and
child welfare agencies.
Id.; Scott, supra note 34, at 668-69 (discussing theory that social norms effectively regulate
behavior within family while avoiding high monitoring and enforcement costs that legal
regulation would require); Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2433-37, 2452 (commenting that in
intact family, "bonding through psychological attachment and informal social norms is an
efficient substitute for invasive restraints on discretion and family privacy"); see also Troxel v.
Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2061 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that "[t]he
law's concept of family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions
[and] historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests oftheir children" (quoting Parham v. JR., 422 U.S. 584,602 (1979))).
259. Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2433; see also Mnookin, supra note 19, at 266 (concluding that parental autonomy to make decisions affecting child is supported by fact that
"[a]ffection for the child and mutual self-interest of family members are more likely to inform
decisions").
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would a child's biological or adoptive parents.2 6° Most parents know their
child better and understand her particular needs and wishes better than the state
is capable of doing.2 ' Moreover, parents generally are better able than is the
state to apply this knowledge for the benefit oftheir child and, relatedly, to give
the child the individual attention that she needs. 262 This individual attention is
regarded as necessary to the development of the psychological parent-child
relationship that is thought to be critical to the child's healthy development.2 63
Finally, some have argued that state deference to the intact family itself
plays an instrumental role in promoting good parental behavior.2 4 It might
seem, on the surface, that respect for the parental right ofprivacy comes at the
cost of consideration of the child's interests and, therefore, does not advance
the state's goal of promoting the physical and emotional well-being of the
developing child. Indeed, many commentators have explored this alleged
parental rights/children's interests dichotomy and have decried the emphasis
on parental rights.265
260. See GoLDsTEiTNTB AL, supra note 31, at 11-12 (arguing that state's inability to function as adequate parent justifies policy of minimal state intervention in family); Czapanskiy,
supranote 26, at 962 ("Society entrusts children to caregivers because we believe that society
cannot raise children as well as individuals can.'); Mnookin, supranote 19, at 267-68 ("[W]hat
has happened to children in the foster-care system - where the state has primary responsibility
for the care of some children - should give pause to those seeking broader state authority.");
Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2415 (commenting that "as a general matter, the state is not well
suited to substitute for parents in the job of child rearing").
261. See Gilles,supra note 19, at 165 ("A moment's reflection will show that courts are
neither as well-placed as parents to discern the child's best interests nor as interested in ensuring
that the child's welfare is in fact advanced."); Mnookin, supra note 19,at 266 (pointing out that
family members are more likely than state to have direct knowledge about child family member).
262. See GOlDSTEINET AL., supra note 31, at 12 (discussing parents' ability to focus on
individual needs of children). Goldstein and others stated:
The legal system has neither the resources nor the sensitivity to respond to a
growing child's ever-changing needs and demands. It does not have the capacity
to deal on an individual basis with the consequences of its decisions, or to act with
the deliberate speed that is required by a child's sense of time.
Id.
263. See id. at 9-12 (arguing that parental autonomy is necessary for establishment and
maintenance of psychological parent-child relationship "critical to every child's healthy growth
and development"); see also id. at 28-29,40-42 (arguing that state intrusion on bonds between
child and long-time caretaker should be minimized regardless of whether long-time caretaker
is legal parent to child).
264. Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2463.
265. See id. at 2456 (citing to several commentators who "assume that this deference to
parental authority would be greatly diminished were the law to focus instead on children's
welfare"); Woodhouse, supranote 171, at 1001 (arguing that "[s]tamped on the reverse side of
the coinage of family privacy and parental rights are the child's voicelessness, objectification,
and isolation from the community"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on ParentalRights," 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1752-54, 1844-58
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But parental rights and children's interests are not necessarily a zero sum
game in inextricable opposition to each other. 2 Professors Elizabeth Scott
and Robert Scott have set forth a relational model of state regulation of the
parent-child relationship that takes up this point.2" This model, which the
Scotts have labeled the "fiduciary heuristic," centers on a reciprocal relationship between the interests of children and the rights of parents to raise their
children largely free from government intrusion. 26s The Scotts view parental
autonomy as compensation from the state for the parents' satisfactory performance in meeting the needs of their children.269 Moreover, the Scotts argue
that state deference to the intact family in most cases, although couched in
terms of "parents' rights," is the best means to motivate parents to filfill their
parental obligations and to meet their children's needs. 0
Central to the Scotts' argument is the assumption that a strong motivation
for a parent to become a parent and to sacrifice for and invest in her child is
the expectation that the parent will be allowed to raise the child within the
family unit as she sees fit." State regulation ofthe family must therefore take
into consideration how parental role satisfaction promotes good parenting
behavior and consider whether interference with parental autonomy
will
272
decrease that role satisfaction and, thus, discourage good parenting:
The absence ofpecuniary compensation to parents for capablyperforming
parental tasks necessarily increases the value ofnonpecuniary substitutes
suchasreputationandrolesatisfaction. Onthis dimension, parental authority over the relationship with children is offered as the quid pro quo for
satisfactoxy performance. Itisunlikelythat, inahypotheticalbargain over
the terms oftheirperformance, parents would agreetoundertaketherespon(1993) (deciying family law's privileging of legal parents over functional parents and proposing
that law confer parental authority on those who nurture child).
266.

See Susan L. BrooksA FamilySystems ParadigmforLegalDecision
MakingAffect-

ing ChildCustody,6 CoRNEELJ.L. &PUB. POL'Y 1, 10 (1996) (arguing that "the rights, as well
as the needs and interests of children and parents, are inextricably intertwined" and for that
reason it is error "to speak of them as dichotomous, or worse, as opposed to each other"); Cahn,
supra note 29, at 49 ("Instead of reinforcing a dichotomy between the interests of parents and
the interests of children, we should recognize that in most cases, they overlap significantly.");
Gilles, supra note 19, at 158 ("Parental rights are a means to the end of protecting the best
interests of children, not a license for parents arbitrarily to control their children's lives.").
267.

See generally Scott & Scott, supranote 40.

268. Id. at 2474.
269. Id. at2418, 2456, 2474.
270. See id. at 2456 (arguing that although grants of parental authority are frequently
justified in terms of parental rights, parental authority and discretion are actually "the necessary
quid pro quos for parents undertaking the responsibilities of parenthood").
271. Id. at 2431,2440,2463,2474.
272. See id. at 2418, 2431, 2440, 2463 (discussing importance of parental role satisfaction
and state's interest in promoting and protecting that satisfaction).
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sibilities desiredbythe statewithoutassurancethattheirinvestmentwould
receivelegalprotection. Recognitionoftheseparental claims insomeform
isaniimportantinducementto encourage investmentin children's welfare.M

In sum, because of the widely accepted view that extensive state regulation of the intact family is not necessary, would not be likely to optimize
outcomes in the run of cases, and might function as a disincentive to good

parenting, the state generally will infringe the intact family's parental autonomy only to guard against abuse or neglect of the child or to protect the child

from a likelihood of some specified harmy 4

2. State Intervention in the FracturedFamily
The state intervenes to a much greater extent in the fractured family than
it does in the intact family."

Several rationales are thought to support this

increased state intrusion. These rationales generally fit within the categories
of child protection and dispute resolution."'
Upon fracture of the intact family, the unity of interests between family

members - between parent and parent, and between parent and child - also
fractures." At the same time, some of the social norms and bonds promoting
good parenting also break down, making it more likely that the parents in a
fractured family - particularly the non-custodial parent - will act selfishly in

prioritizing the newly antagonistic interests of family members."' Moreover;
the parents in the fractured family are more likely to have new family ties that
compete with the interests ofthe children of the fiactured family." Finally,
the consensus that could be counted on to resolve disputes in the intact family
no longer can be counted on to resolve disputes in the fractured family." For
273. Id. at 2440; see also Czapanskiy, supra note 26, at 980 n.38 (arguing that Scotts' relational model should be presumed also to apply to single parents and other committed caregivers,
and that unpredictability introduced by legal intervention might serve as incentive to such
caregivers to abandon their caregiving role).
274. See Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2452 ("Legal directives that function as supplemental precommitments are appropriately limited [when dealing with an intact family] to issues
where a strong societal consensus dictates mandatory behavior.").
275. See id. at 2455 ("In general, parents who are divorced, and to a far greater extent,
those whose children are in state custody, are subject to a degree of judicial and state agency
supervision that would be deemed violative of family privacy if applied to intact families.").
276. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 229 (identifying dispute resolution and child protection as two distinct functions performed by court in child custody adjudications).
277. Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2446-48.
278. Id.at2446.
279. Id. at 2447.
280. See id. at 2448-49 (observing that fracture of family increases risk that parents will
disagree on best means to promote their children's best interests, necessitating creation of legal
rules to settle disagreements that normally would be handled informally within family).
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all of these reasons, our society accepts that state intervention is more appro-

priate in the fractured family than it is in the intact family.
The principal justification for state intervention in the fractured family
is the disunity of interests that appears at fracture. It is thought that, prior to
fracture, the mutual affection and mutual dependence of family members will
tend to ensure that the needs of all family members are considered in arriving
at family decisions." These bonds of affection and dependence weaken at
fracture of the family to the point that they no longer are dependable safeguards of each family member's interests.' Indeed, a hostility of the parents
toward each other, often found incident to divorce, gives rise to the danger
that one or both ofthe parents might act principally out of a desire to harm the
other parent rather than principally out of a desire to do what is best for the
child. 283
The prototypical example ofthe disunity ofinterests appearing at fracture
of the family arises from the maintenance of two separate households: The
non-custodial parent no longer shares the same principal residence with her
child and former spouse and thus no longer personally experiences any shortcomings in the child's primary home setting." For example, in circumstances
in which the custodial parent's financial resources, independent of the noncustodial parent's resources, coupled with his or her family obligations, dictate that the child's principal residence is unsafe and pest-infested, the nonustodial parent does not experience these discomforts directly. It is thought
that, in the intact family, the parents' direct experience of these discomforts

ordinarily will serve as an incentive forthe parents to take appropriate, feasible
281.

GOLDSTEINETAL., supra note 31, at22 n.* (quoting GOLDSTEiNETAL.,BEYONDTBE
oF THE CHILD 66 n.* (1973)); see also Woodhouse, supra note 257, at 1253
("[I]n the vast majority of cases, the interests of the dominant and dependent members in a
caretaking relationship are closely intertwined.').
282. See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on PrivateOrdering, 18
U. MiCH. JL. REFORM 1015,1031-34 (1985) (acknowledging that divorcing spouses given legal
right to settle their post-dissolution rights and responsibilities might reach settlement that
reflects their own selfish interests to detriment of their children's needs, but nevertheless
arguing that divorcing parents should have such right subject to standards that protect their
children from abuse and neglect).
283. See Charlow, supra-note 229, at 276 (commenting that in contested custody cases
"[o]ften the parties are motivated more by anger against the other party than by feelings of love
and concern for the child"); Mnookin & Komhauser, supranote 40, at 968, 974 (hypothesizing
that bargaining preferences of divorcing parents might "reflect spite and envy [and] ... a strong
wish to punish the other spouse, regardless of the detriment to himself or to the children");
Scott, supra note 34, at 636 (arguing that parent's divorce litigation positions might not reflect
that parent's true desires for two reasons: first, what parent truly desires might not be obtainable option and, second, that parent might be trying to spite other parent).
284. See Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2448 (arguing that parents not living with their
children are less likely to give priority to their children's financial needs).
BEST INTERESTS
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ameliorative actions." To the contrary, in a fractured family, the non-custodial parent's voluntary efforts to mitigate the child's unfortunate home setting
would result in the non-custodial parent's having fewer resources to devote
to the maintenance of her own principal residence. This disunity of interests
is the primary rationale for imposing child support obligations on the noncustodial paren.26
Factors arising from the dissolution ofthe parent-parent relationship also
contribute to the disunity of interests between the child and her non-custodial
parent.'
These factors might cause the non-custodial parent to resolve
conflicts of interest without due regard for the interests of the child.25 For
example, the non-custodial parent's post-fracture relationship with her child
commonly is subject to new stresses that might cause the non-custodial parent
to pull away from the relationship. 9 One new stress in many cases is that the
non-custodial parent's post-fracture contact with the child is less frequent as
compared to the level of contact before the fracture." A second stress is that
post-fracture contact might also bring unpleasant interactions with a custodial
parent with whom the non-custodial parent is in chronic conflict. 91 Moreover, dissolution of the parents' relationship might greatly diminish the noncustodial parent's authority over the child.' Finally, it is thought that informal social norms encouraging good parenting weaken at fracture of the
family.M
These factors might combine so that the non-custodial parent experiences
diminished satisfaction from her relationship with her child.294 Detachment
may then follow. The likelihood of detachment would seem greater if the
non-custodial parent is able to find personal fiflfillment in new family ties that
have supplemented those from the fractured family.29 5 Such detachment from
the fractured family, especially if detachment is coupled with attachment to
285. See id. ("Parents in family units share their children's standard of living and, through
informal influences, can usually be trusted collectively to take their children's needs into
account in allocating family resources.").
286. Id.
287. See id. at 2446 (discussing effects of family fracture on parent-child relationship).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 2447.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. If the parents enjoy joint legal custody with respect to their child after fracture, this
is not necessarily the case.

293.

See Scott, supra note 34, at 669 ("Legal oversight also serves to reinforce informal

social norms, weakened in the context of divorce, by directing parents to fulfill their prescribed

responsibilities despite the breakdown of the marriage.").
294. Scott & Scott, supra note 40, at 2447.
295.

Id.
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a new source of familial fulfillment, makes it more likely that the non-custodial parent will neglect the needs of
the child of the fractured family or other2 96
wise discount the child's interests.
A final factor thought to justify state intervention in the fractured family
is the simple fact that someone must resolve intractable disputes that arise in
the fractured family. The intact family is presumed to govern itself by consensus.' The parties to a fractured family relationship, however, are less likely
to reach such a consensus." Therefore, the state might have to intervene to
resolve intractable disputes or to invest authority in one parent to do so.'
Indeed, in the case of parents who are unable to agree on a custody matter and
who then ask the court to decide the matter for them, the parents have waived
their parental autonomy with respect to the disputed matter.3"
3. Application ofPrudentialPolicies Governing State Deference to and
Intervention in the Family to the Arbitrabilityof Custody Disputes
In evaluating how the prudential factors discussed above should impact
the enforceability of custody arbitration agreements and awards, it is helpful
to keep in mind the two distinct categories of purpose that state intervention
in the fractured family serves. State intervention at dissolution serves a
dispute resolution function and a child protective function." The state serves
a dispute resolution function whenever competing claimants seek a court
determination of the proper custodial and visitation arrangements for a
child.3" Custody proceedings serve a child protective function only when the
state evaluates whether one of the persons who seeks custody or visitation
privileges with respect to a child presents a danger to that child.3 3 As Professor Robert Mnookin has observed:
[Clourts perform two very different functions in the resolution of custody
disputes: private-dispute-settlement and child-protection. The privatedispute-settlementfunction is involved when the court must choose between two or more private individuals, each of whom claims an associa296.

See id. (stating that new attachments formed by non-custodial parents makes "fulfill-

ment of previously established parental responsibilities more burdensome").
297. Id. at 2448-49.
298. Id. at 2449.
299. Id.
300.

GoLDSTIN ET AL, supra note 31, at 24; see also id. at 32 (discussing import of

waivers of parental authority).
301. Mnookin, supra note 19, at 229; see also id. at 232 (discussing role of dispute
resolution function); id. at 248 (discussing interrelation of dispute resolution function and child

protection function).
302. Id. at232.
303.

Id. at 229, 232, 248.
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tional interest with the child.... By providing ajudicial forum, the state
protects the substantial public interest in resolving such disputes without
resort to private force or violence and also protects the expectations and
interests of the individuals directly affected, including the child. The
second fumction, child-protection,involves the judicial enforcement of
standards ofparentalbehaviorbelieved necessaryto protect the child. This
function is consistent with the well established principle that the parens
patriae power of the state empowers courts to remove children from
parental custody if that is necessary for their protection.'
Whenthe separating parents reach a final accord concerning child custody
and visitation matters, the state need not perform a dispute resolution function
at all with respect to child custody. 305 Similarly, when the parents have agreed
to a private alternate dispute resolution method, such as the adjudication of
their custody dispute by a private arbitrator, the state has no dispute resolution
function to perform with respect to child custody. Therefore, although state
intervention at fracture generally is thought appropriate to resolve intractable
disputes between the separating parents, this rationale cannot justify state
intervention in the parent-child relationship so as to determine custody rights
when the parents have contracted for a private determination as to the proper
custodial and visitation arrangements for their child.
Parents ought not to have the right, however, to contract out ofthe state's
child protective function. The state's child protective function justifies state
intervention in the parent-child relationship to protect a child from abuse or
neglect or a likelihood of harm. This "abuse or neglect" standard proscribes
physical, sexual, and psychological abuse and mandates minimum standards
for physical nourishment, clothing and shelter.s"° The state also is justified in
infringing upon parental autonomy pursuant to the child protective function
to ensure that parents meet certain other standards on which there is an
undeniable social consensus." Restrictions on child labor, and requirements
for compulsory education and mandatory immunizations fall into this cate3
gory. 08
304.
305.

Id. at 229.
See GoLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 31, at 31-33 (arguing that separation of child's

parents alone should not serve as grounds for state intervention in family, rather, parents who
are able to agree on custody and visitation matters should be free to do so without state interference).
306. See Von Eiff v. Azicr, 720 So. 2d 510, 515 (Fla. 1998) (listing as types of harm to
children that have warranted government intervention in parental decisionmaking "clear threat
of abuse, neglect and death," including sexual abuse and withholding of "reasonable medical
treatment that is necessary for the preservation of life," but not "potential harm to a child
flowing from the death of a parent").
307.
308.

GOLDSTENETAL., supra note 31, at 16.
Id.
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The state's child protective flnction is not understood, however, to allow
the state to intervene solely to provide the child with an optimal experience however "optimal" might be defined. This is because "[i]mplicitly, we have
a shared assumption that the court's child-protection function is to enforce

minimum social standards, not to intervene coercively in an attempt to do what
is best or least detrimental."" 9 As Professor Stephen Gilles has explained
more fully:
[A]ny choice that is not in a child's best interests must, by hypothesis, be
harmful to the child as compared to whatever choice is in the child's best
interests. But in everyday life we do not normally equate harm to children
with "evmything other than what is best for children." Rather, in light of
the difficulties of reaching consensus on what is best for children, most
people reservethe word "harmful" for choicesthat seem drasticallyinferior
to what they perceive to be the best choice .... We do something similar
inthe law of childrearing: as a very rough approximation, state family law
andfederal constitutional law letparents decidewheretheir children's best
interests lie, subject to the state's power to override parental choices that
are harmful in some strong sense- that are "destructive" or "abusive"
and
3 10
therefore warrant legal intervention, not just raised eyebrows.

Professor Mnookin illustrates this point well with two hypothetical
families - the Smiths and the Joneses.3 ' In short, the Smiths, who wish to
adopt a newborn baby, are healthy, wealthy and wise. The Joneses, who have
a four-day old baby, are most certainly less so. Even if all could agree that the
Smiths would function as "better" parents for the Joneses' baby, the state will
not, without more
justification, transfer custody of the child from the Joneses
3 12
to the Smiths.
The example of the Smiths and the Joneses suggests that the "best interests ofthe child" standard should be utilized, if at all, only as a dispute resolu309. Mnookin,supra note 19,at268.
310. Gilles, supra note 19, at 167; see also Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2076
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing behavior that is considered harmful to child).
Justice Kennedy stated:
While it might be argued as an abstract matter that in some sense the child is always
harmed if his or her best interests are not considered, the law of domestic relations,
as it has evolved to this point, treats as distinct the two standards, one harm to the
child and the other the best interests of the child.
Id.
311. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 268-69 (illustrating principle that court's role is to
enforce minimal societal standards of child welfare, and not to intervene and make judgments
about what would be best for child).
312. Id.; see alsoIn re Knott, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (Tenn. 1917) ("The mere fact that the
petitioners desire to adopt the child and that they are in better financial condition than its natural
parents will never authorize a decree of adoption.").
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tion standard. When two parties ask the state to adjudicate their custody
dispute, the state must utilize some standard for selecting between the competing claimants. In such circumstances, state intrusion into the parent-child relationship is agiven. While many have questioned whether the "best interests
of the child" standard is the best dispute resolution standard,"' the state
a standard in carrying out the intervention that
reasonably might adopt such
31 4
the parties have requested.
The "best interests of the child" standard, however, generally is overly
broad as a child protective standard.315 In carrying out its child protective function, the state need not, and should not, replace parental values with its own
values or supercede parental judgment with its own judgment merely because
it believes that by doing so it will optimize the child's welfare. The state goes
beyond "child protection" when it overrules a parental decision merely because
it believes that the parents could have made a "better" decision.
In sum, when the parties to a custody dispute have contracted out of
public adjudication of their dispute and have opted for private arbitration of
their dispute, the state cannot justify the use of the best interests standard of
review of any resulting custody arbitration award on the grounds that the state
must resolve intractable disputes that arise at fracture of the family. Moreover, the state may not justify the use of the best interests standard of review
on grounds that the state must carry out its child protective function. Instead,
the state may adequately carry out its child protective function by reviewing
any custody arbitration award to ensure that the award does not promote abuse
or neglect of the child or subject the child to a likelihood of harm. 16 ExamiSee supra notes 228-35 and accompanying text (discussing how application of "best
313.
interest" standard allows courts to impose their value systems on parents).
314. See Matter of Marriage of Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 62-63 (Or. 1987) (explaining that in

custody dispute between two legal parents, court utilizes best interests of child standard because
"the competing custodial rights tend to cancel each other, leaving only the interests of children
as relevant considerations").
See id. (explaining that in custody dispute between legal parent and third party, use
315.
of best interests of child standard is not appropriate means for state to carry out its parens
patriae duty to protect child from present or future threat to her well-being).
316. See Scott, supra note 34, at 639 & n.74 (arguing that, absent parental abuse or neglect
of child, mere circumstance that parents are before court to obtain divorce is not sufficient
justification for court to disregard past parental roles and to restructure family responsibilities).
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its American
implementing legislation, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1998), provide a model for comparison.
Convention on the CivilAspects ofIntemational Child Abduction, openedfor signature October
10, 1980, T.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague
Convention requires the state, in certain circumstances, to decline jurisdiction over a child
custody matter so that the matter may be decided in an alternate foreign forum that may well
provide a very different law of child custody and may well reflect a distinct cultural sensibility
as contrasted with the law and sensibility of the state court That removal ofthe case to a foreign
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nation of the remaining prudential factors discussed above further supports
the conclusion that it would be appropriate for the state to adopt a standard of
review of custody arbitration awards that is more deferential to parental autonomy than is the "best interests of the child" standard.
Recall that among the reasons given for deference to the intact family is
the belief that deference itself is an incentive to good parenting. In connection
with this factor, and in considering the effect that the enforcement of custody
arbitration agreements will have on the child's development, one must also
consider the effect that the non-arbitrability of custody disputes will have on
the intact fhmily. In some cases, this lack of deference to parental autonomy
is likely to have profound effects.
Consider, for example, the family headed by a same-sex couple. The
effect of non-arbitrability of custody disputes is that the couple would be left
upon dissolution of their partnership with only the public court system and the
dominant rules of standing and substantive custody standards to govern and
resolve their custody dispute. Assuming that the same-sex couple resides in
one of the majority of states that does not allow for two legally-recognized
mothers or two legally-recognized fathers, one ofthe partners in the same-sex
couple would likely stand in an inferior position in relation to the other
concerning custody and visitation rights pertaining to the child upon dissolution of the legal parent/non-legal parent relationship. The non-legal parent
might have no chance of defeating the legal parent in a custody dispute
(absent a showing that the legal31parent
is unfit) and might not even have
7
standing to petition for visitation.
The instrumental function of deference to family autonomy should be
considered against the background ofthis legal landscape. Recall the hypothjurisdiction would not be in the "best interests of the child" is not among the defenses against
removal that the Hague Convention provides. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2) (1988) (citing to
Hague Convention text for defenses against custody proceedings provided for by act); Hague
Convention, arts. 12, 13, 20 (providing defenses against custody proceedings). Rather, the
Hague Convention allows an American court to refuse to decline jurisdiction over the custody
matter where return ofthe child to another countrywould pose a "grave risk" that the child would
be exposed to "physical or psychological harm" or otherwise would be placed in an "intolerable
situation." 42 U.S.C. § 11603(eX2)(A) (1988); Hague Convention, art. 13. Butsee Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978) (providing for tribal jurisdiction over many child
welfare and adoption cases involving children of tribal descent but, in section 1911 (b), providing
for retention ofjurisdiction in state court where "good cause" for retention is shown). See also
Carriere, supra note 35, at 590 (noting that number of courts have interpreted "good cause"
language in Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to mean whenever best interests of child militate
in favor of retention and arguing that "the 'best interests of the child' standard... is so embedded
in Euro-American law and culture that according it a privileged position in cases falling under
the ICWA prevents aNative American subjectivity from emerging").
317. See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text (discussing challenges lesbian coparents face in structuring legal family relationships).
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esis advanced by Professors Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott that parental
authority is nonpecuniary compensation for the parents' performance of their
parental duties.3"' Thus, the non-legal parent's knowledge that she serves as
parent at the pleasure ofher partner might have a profound effect on the extent
to which the non-legal parent is willing to invest in the child's development.
It is a great deal to expect of a parent that she invest in a relationship with
her child, give her emotional and physical energy to the child, devote her
financial resources to the child, and subordinate her career development for
the child, with the knowledge that at any moment she may be denied further
contact with her child without legal recourse to challenge this turn of events.
For this reason, the non-arbitrability of custody disputes might have a pro-

found negative impact on a gay or lesbian co-parenting family even if the
family never dissolves during the child's minority. Even absent fracture, the
disincentive of non-arbitrability might result in the child's being raised with
one of her two co-parents never fully committing her emotions, skills, and
resources to the child's development.319
More generally, the liberal enforcement of custody arbitration agreements
and awards would allow parents the autonomy to create the type of family that
comports with the parents' central values. To-the extent that this autonomy
increases parental satisfaction and commitment to the family, the enforcement
of custody arbitration agreements and awards should serve as an incentive to
good parenting. Thus, this prudential factor weighs in favor of the deferential
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards for child custody.
A second reason given for deference to the intact family is the belief that
the state is likely to function less ably as a parent than a child's biological or
adoptive parents are likely to function. This belief is based, in part, on the
understanding that parents know their child's wants and needs better than the
state is capable of knowing them. This factor would seem to hold true even
after fracture of the family. 2 ° A child's parents still are likely to have far
superior knowledge of the child's circumstances than a court is likely to gain
through litigation.
318. See supra notes 264-73 and accompanying text (reviewing arguments that parental
authority is compensation granted by state to parents for performance of parenting duties).
319. See Scott, supra note 34, at 628-29 (arguing that primary caretaker preference in
custody decisionmaking "discourages a 'secondary' parent from investing in his relationship
with the child because a secondary relationship, however, significant, will not get much legal
protection"); see also id.at 672 (arguing that courts, in structuring child custody and visitation
awards, should attempt to approximate patterns of parental conduct during pre-fracture period
as means to encourage investment in parenting).
320. See Czapanskiy, supra note 26, at 974-75,993 (setting forth approach for custody and
visitation decisionmaking grounded in deference to caregiver's choices and premised on belief
that "it would be exceptional for a child's caregivers notto know better than outsiders, including
courts and court-appointed experts, what is best for the child in their care").
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Moreover, arbitration allows for child custody decisionmaking that capitalizes on this parental knowledge. Arbitration allows the parents the opportunity to choose an arbitrator for their custody dispute on the basis of her
familiarity with the family or her understanding of the values that the parents
hold dear and have tried to follow in raising their child. In such cases, one
might reasonably anticipate that the arbitrator will reach a decision that is
more in accord with the family's true needs, wants, and values than would a
judge deciding the case in public custody litigation.
A final reason given for deference to the intact family is the belief that,
in general, state intervention is not necessary because parents tend to have
their child's best interests at heart. It is this prudential reason for deference
that generally is thought most to break down at fracture of the family. Conventional wisdom holds that because of the disunity of interests arising at
fracture of the family coupled with the increased possibility of parental
detachment from the members of the fractured family, less deference should
be paid to parental decisionmaking in the fractured family.
Consider, for example, the case of the lesbian who plans her pregnancy
with her partner with whom she has shared a long-term committed relationship. The partners choose to become parents together, choose the spermdonor together, and execute a written agreement providing that the nonbiological mother shall have "an indefinite grant of custody" with respect to
the child. Upon the child's birth, the non-biological mother is listed in the
child's medical records as a parent. During their child's early childhood, the
co-parents live together with their child and jointly perform the duties of
parenthood. Upon dissolution of the parent-parent relationship, however, the
biological mother cuts off all contact between the non-biological mother and
the child." The biological mother then asserts ' t he right of a parent to be
free from interference by one [un]related, [ ]either by blood [ ]or marriage, to
her child .... " She seeks to deny the non-biological mother custody and
visitation rights, not on the merits, but on the ground that such a "stranger to
[the] child" lacks standing to seek such rights?'
One might reasonably suspeotthat the biological mother has put aside the
best interests of her child in the effort to win the custody battle. As Professor
Nancy Polikoff has commented:
The children born to the families whose cases are discussed [in Professor
Polikoff's article on planned lesbian families] have two mothers who
321. These facts are essentially those alleged by the non-biological mother in Kazmierazak
v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1999). Initial Brief of Appellant at 1-3,
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1999) (No. 98-02854).
322. The arguments are those made by the biological mother in Kazmierazakv. Query, 736
So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1999). Initial Brief of Appellee at 4-6, Kazmierazak v. Query,
736 So. 2d 106 (Fa. Dist Ct. App. 1999) (No. 98-02854).
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wllinglyparticipatedintheirconceptionandbirth, and who openly raised
them as coparents. If any ofthe biological mothers can prove it is in the
child's best interests to deny contact between the child and the other
mother, she shouldlitigatethecase onthatbasis. Attemptingto avoid such
litigationonthemeritsbyequaingthenon-biologicalmother'slegal status
with that ofa babysitter or family friend does not demonstrate a principled
defense of either parental rights or the best interests of children. Rather,
the technique is a bad faith assertion of a definition of parenthood that is
no longer adequate to recognize contemporary family forms.'
Thus, the fear that many parents in a custody dispute will act from selfish
motives without proper regard for their child's best interests is not without
some support. This arguably well-grounded fear gives rise to the argument
that the specter of selfish behavior on the part of one or both parents upon
dissolution of their relationship militates against leaving the child's fate in the
hands of an arbitrator selected by the squabbling parents. 24
This rationale for intervention has little force, however, with respect to
a pre-fiacture agreement to arbitrate custody issues. Indeed, one might turn
this argument on its head. An agreement concerning resolution of any future
custody dispute reached by the two co-parents while the family is intact, prior
to the disunity of interests and the other destabilizing factors that dissolution
brings, is far more likely to reflect the parents' true and most sound feelings
as to what is in the best interests oftheir child than is the post-fracture litigation position of either parent."2 This factor alone is sufficientjustification for
subjecting a pre-fracture arbitration agreement regarding custody and a
resulting custody arbitration award to a less intrusive standard of judicial
review than is imposed on a post-fracture separation agreement for custody.
As such, it undermines the reasoning of the courts that refuse to treat an
arbitration award for custody as binding and instead look to the settled law on
separation agreements regarding custody.

323. Polikoff, supra note 22, at 542.
324. See Philbrick, supra note 101, at 434 (concluding that desire for judicial oversight of
separation agreements concerning child custody is motivated in large part by fear that custody
disputants will put their own interests before those of their child).
325. See Fineman, supra note 129, at 1223 n.92 (arguing that initial custody decisions
should be made under primary caretaker standard because such standard validates autonomy and
decisions of prior intact family, and that modification of such initial custody decision should be
made only upon finding of abuse or neglect); Scott, supra note 34, at 617, 630 (arguing that
custody decisionmakers should seek to approximate roles that parents played prior to fracture of
family because, inter alia, such prior roles are likely to be best indication of parents' true preferencea); Scott & Scott, supra note 254, at 1323 (arguing that interests offuture parents negotiating
premarital agreement "can generally be assumed to be aligned with those oftheir future children,
an assumption that probably cannot be made ex post inthe context of divorce itself).
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V Conclusion
Arbitration has great potential utility for promoting family autonomy.
Parents in a fracturing family might utilize arbitration to select both the
decisionmaker and the legal standards to guide that decisionmaker in resolving
their child custody and visitation dispute. In this way, the parents can seek to
ensure that the resolution of their child custody and visitation dispute is
governed by the values that the family has cherished and lived by.
The present dominant judicial approaches to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards with respect to child custody, however, greatly
undermine arbitration's utility for promoting family autonomy. Pursuant to
the void approach to judicial review of such arbitration agreements and
awards, the court entirely disregards the custody arbitration agreement or
award. Such an approach retards the ability of parents, including those
parents in an intact family, to use an arbitration agreement to structure their
family responsibilities and rights as they desire and think most appropriate.
Pursuant to the voidable approach to judicial review of custody arbitration
agreements and awards, the court replaces an arbitration award for child
custody entered by a decisionmaker selected by the child's parents whenever
the court feels that its own custody order would better serve the "best interests" of the child. Thus, when the court's values conflict with the parents'
values, the court's values will control the custody decision.
The courts that utilize the void and voidable approaches to judicial
review of custody arbitration agreements and awards should reexamine their
approach in light of the general principles that govern state deference to, and
intervention in, the family. The prudential considerations that militate against
extensive state intervention in the family support the conclusion that the state
is likely to optimize outcomes in the run of custody disputes by giving great
deference to parent-sponsored arbitration awards for custody. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's recent discussion of parental autonomy in Troxel v. Granville strongly supports the conclusion that the dominant approaches impermissibly infinge upon the constitutional right ofparental autonomy by failing
to give the requisite special weight to a parent's views regarding custody and
visitation arrangements concerning her child.

